THE INTERPRETATION OF A MONASTIC RULE[1]
THE GENERAL CHAPTER of 1967,
during its twenty-sixth session, affirmed that the Rule of St Benedict remains
the basis of our Cistercian legislation[1].
The same General Chapter also approved a certain number of experiments or
adaptations, some of which constitute a departure from a literal observance of
the Rule. This raises the question of fidelity to the Rule, a question which
concerns every facet of our monastic life. All its dimensions must be studied.
The attitudes which individuals
or groups take with regard to this problem often stem from more fundamental,
oftentimes quite vague propensities. These attitudes concern the relationship
of the Rule to Scripture, to the monastic tradition as a whole, and to contemporary
man. And the fundamental problem in every case is one of hermeneutics.
It is this problem of the
hermeneutics, or of the interpretation of the Rule that I wish to deal with in
this paper. I do not pretend to offer a solution. I simply wish to state the
problem in terms as exact as possible, and indicate what might lead to a
solution. Nor am I forgetting that solutions to this sort of problem ought
first to be worked out in real life, before they can be conceptualized in a
satisfactory manner.
Preliminary Notions: the Task of Hermeneutics
The empirical method has
gradually taken over in all the sciences, theology included. As Fr Bernard.
Lonergan sj explained at the Theology Congress at Toronto in August 1967,
theology has become empirical in the sense that Scripture and tradition no
longer offer it premises from which it may draw conclusions, but rather data
to interpret[2].
Consequently, the most crucial and fundamental problems which present
themselves to man today, in every domain of learning, are problems of interpretation,
that is, problems of hermeneutics. That is why, in what concerns the sacred
sciences, the methods of hermeneutics which have been established for biblical
exegesis are being rethought more and more, with a view to using them for the study
of tradition.
We can distinguish two forms of
interpretation with regard to documents considered as part of tradition:
historic and dynamic[3]. Historical
interpretation consists in discovering the precise meaning of a text in itself,
what the author really wanted to say. The instruments used in this sort of
interpretation are textual, historical, and literary criticism. This kind of
interpretation, while remaining on the historical level, can become systematic
if, over and above the use of these methods of criticism, superior norms of
interpretation are introduced which bring to light the doctrinal, philosophical
and theological presuppositions underlying the text.
But it is also possible to
surpass this level of historical interpretation and arrive at an interpretation
which is dynamic. That is to say, one may use the interpreted text as a
starting point for arriving at a deeper understanding of the reality which the
text expresses. This method is extremely important for interpreting texts of
the Church's magisterium, especially conciliar documents.
The magisterium. texts deal with
realities which can not be reduced to formulas, and which are infinitely
greater than any conceptual expression that one might give them. Even dogmatic
definitions, infallible and irrevocable as they may be, never express perfectly
and completely the reality to which they refer. Further, although the living
magisterium is the immediate norm for faith, the ultimate and fundamental norm
is Holy Scripture. Therefore, even if the task of the magisterium is to
interpret Scripture, any given text of tradition or of the Fathers of the
Church can only he interpreted correctly if it is viewed in the light of
Scripture and the whole of the tradition of the Church: these two constitute its
integral context.
Everything which I have explained
here about interpretation of texts holds good for the facts of Church History,
for tradition manifests itself through these facts also.
Now if we apply these
methodological principles to an interpretation of the Rule, we find ourselves
in the following position. In order to understand the Rule, we should first
work out an interpretation which is critical and historical; that is to say, by
using methods of textual, literary and historical criticism we should be able
to determine the exact meaning of each part of the Rule, of each of its
phrases. In other words, we should be able to discover what the author of the
Rule really wanted to say. At this stage of research, it still is not a
question of providing a commentary on the Rule. This is rather a scientific
explanation on which any ulterior commentary would need to be based. Excellent
works have already been produced in this line of critical and historical
interpretation of the Rule. This work should be followed up. But the results of
this historical interpretation cannot aid us in a direct manner to determine
the orientation which monastic renewal should take. They have to be completed
by a dynamic interpretation.
What is this dynamic
interpretation of the Rule? I hope that this will become clearer as we continue
with our study. But for the moment, let me say that such an interpretation will
consist of a reevaluation of the Rule as a whole, and of each of its elements
in the light of Holy Scripture and the whole of tradition.
Before speaking specifically of
our own attitude toward the Rule, we have to ascertain its relationship with
Scripture and tradition - that is to say, the tradition of the Church in
general as well as monastic tradition. The plan of this study then appears as
follows:
The Rule and the Gospel
The Rule and Tradition
The Rule and Monastic History
The Rule and Ourselves.
The Rule and the Gospel
The Gospel, the fundamental and
irreplaceable norm of the Christian life, remains the first Rule for the monk.
Hence it is necessary to point out the relationship between the Rule and
Scripture. And this, of course, should be done by starting with a notion of
Holy Scripture which is theologically exact.
Thanks to developments in the
field of the theology of history, we are now accustomed to viewing revelation
as something dynamic rather than static. Revelation is the personal entrance of
God into human history, and the Christian life is man's response to this
personal and completely gratuitous intervention by God. It is this intervention
which is the supreme norm of every type of Christian life. Holy Scripture is
precisely the objectification in writing-by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit,
but in human language-of the divine fact of revelation. Because it is
coextensive with the factual reality, this first written objectification has a
primary normative value for the whole life of the People of God in the ages
following the Incarnation of Christ.
It is enough to read and meditate
on the Rule of St Benedict to appreciate its completely evangelical character.
It paints a beautiful picture of the Gospel-life lived in its fullness. Does
this mean that it is a "digest of the Gospel" as is sometimes said?
Actually, such an expression is extremely ambiguous. People who use it all too
easily lead one to believe that the Rule gathers everything together from the
Gospel which would be useful for monks, so that they need not bother going
directly to Scripture. It would be wrong to say that. The Rule is not meant to
replace the Gospel, but to lead the monk to it and help him to understand what
the Gospel requires of him.
The Rule is an interpretation of
the evangelical doctrine on the perfect Christian life. As such, it helps us to
understand the Gospel message. But it should be reinterpreted continually, in
the light of Scripture and the tradition of the Church. So we must also situate
the Rule in its relationship to tradition.
The Rule and Tradition
Tradition is an extremely important human
phenomenon. The philosophers who have studied it have been careful to
distinguish it from history, and to show its relationship to history.
While history is the "becoming" which preserves the past, tradition
is precisely that which is durable; it stands firm during all the mutations of
this "becoming."[4]From
the ontological point of view, tradition is that which makes it possible
for being to be permanent;[5]
from the point of view of hermeneutics, it is the element which makes knowledge
of the past possible[6]. Actually, I
cannot interpret and understand (verstehen) a text or a fact of the past
unless I have a certain anterior knowledge (Vorverstandnis) of the
ontological reality of which this fact is the incarnation, or of which this
text is the objectification.
This pre-intellection is made possible by a type of vital
communication with this reality, and this vital communication is assured by
tradition.
Now, from the strictly
theological point of view, tradition is the objective permanence of revelation,
in the historical "becoming" of the Church. Tradition and historicity
(which means mutation) are correlative realities. The whole work of
interpretation consists in discovering the revealed truth which is veiled by
various historical and contingent forms of objectification.
As with every other element in
the tradition of the Church, the Rule of St Benedict is the objectification of
a transcendent and permanent reality (the evangelical doctrine on the perfect
Christian life) in contingent and changing historical forms. The
interpretation of
the Rule will consist, first of all, in distinguishing what in it is tradition
and what is historicity. This can be accomplished if the method of
dynamic interpretation about which we were just speaking is applied.
Before going further, we ought to
clarify one point. So far, we have been considering the Rule as a spiritual
document which transmits to us the message of the Gospel on the perfect
Christian life. From this point of view, it is one of the elements in the
tradition of the Church, and has as much importance for Christians in general
and for theologians as it has for monks and nuns. But it interprets this Gospel
message in a specific manner. It bears witness to a certain type of spiritual
attitude which characterizes those persons whom history calls monks and nuns.
Thus it transmits the monastic tradition.
Monasticism is, in fact, an
historical reality. And so within the confines of this reality we must once
again distinguish between tradition and historicity. Christian monasticism is
characterized above all by a spiritual attitude before God, before men, and
before the reality of the world. It is this spiritual attitude, abiding despite
the ebb and flow of evolving monastic observances throughout history, which
properly speaking constitutes the monastic tradition.
If we are to distinguish in the
Rule of St Benedict what is monastic tradition and what are its historical and
contingent modalities of objectification (and that is the task of dynamic
interpretation), we will first have to determine at what moment the Rule
entered the ebb and flow of monastic history as an historical fact. Then we
will have to see how monks interpreted St Benedict's Rule in the centuries
which followed.
The Rule in Monastic History
a)
The
Rule as an Historical Fact
The Rule of St Benedict which for
many centuries has dominated practically all of western monasticism is, without
doubt, a document of great value and one which expresses the "monastic
tradition" in a very excellent way. Should we conclude from this, as some people
are perhaps a little too quick to do, that it is a "synthesis" of the
whole monastic tradition? This would certainly be an exaggeration and quite
incorrect. First of all, monastic history did not end with St Benedict, nor did
St Benedict draw up his Rule in the manner of a theoretician. With him, there
was no question of studying the whole tradition which had gone before so that
he could select and retain what was best in it. The Rule of St Benedict is
situated at a certain moment in the historical evolution of monasticism.
The ancient East had known two
great monastic traditions: the cenobitic and the anchoretic. Within each of
these traditions, different currents could be distinguished[7].
The cenobitic tradition came into being just about everywhere at about the same
time, especially in the Judeo-Christian Churches. It had its origin in those
groups of ascetics who had been living within the local Churches from the early
days of Christianity. We find this cenobitic tradition, expressed with varying differences,
amongst the Sons of the Covenant in Persia and Syria, in Pachomian monasticism
in the Thebaid and in Basilian monasticism in Cappadocia. Alongside of this
cenobitic tradition, the anchoretic tradition gradually developed. It seems
that the influence of the Egyptian anchorites was largely responsible for the
spread of this type of fife. It is the semianchoretic tradition of Lower Egypt
which St Benedict knew, receiving it through Cassian and the Master. So
Benedict was situated in a very definite current in the evolution of the great
monastic tradition, and to a great extent, he knew nothing of the other
currents. In his day, he could not possibly have known them all. The fact that
he stresses or fails to stress certain particular elements of monastic
tradition could mean that he had made a choice after a long personal
deliberation, but it could also be simply the result of accidental historical
factors.
Benedict did not receive the
monastic tradition in a fully developed form. Rather, he received it wrapped in
a contingent form of objectification. No element of the Rule can be properly
evaluated unless it is examined and weighed in the light of the whole monastic
tradition. A healthy and honest interpretation ought to be able to recognize
both the strength and weakness of the Rule of St Benedict as well as the
strength and weakness of the monastic current in which the Rule is situated.
b)
Interpretation
of the Rule in History
Thus far we have seen that the
Rule is, first of all, one of the bearers of Church tradition. It is a witness
to the Gospel teaching about the perfect Christian fife. Further, it is a link
in the chain of monastic tradition, handing down to us this "spiritual
attitude"of openness to the Spirit, of total abandonment to God, and of poverty-which
is the essence of the monastic life. This spiritual attitude does not exist in
an abstract state. It has to be expressed in an incarnate form, and the Rule
incarnates it in customs, observances and in the setting of a daily life which
is arranged with great detail. From this point of view, the Rule is also a
juridical code which prescribes the organization of a monastic community in a
specific historical context, for the purpose of assuring the development of
this spiritual attitude.
During the course of monastic
history since St Benedict we can distinguish two trends of attitude toward the
Rule. One sees it primarily as a spiritual document which gives witness
to the fundamental values of the monastic life and which ought to inspire
the monks of the generations to come in their living of the monastic life. The
other trend sees it rather as a juridical code which describes right
down to the last detail what the monastic or Benedictine life ought to be.
This same sort of dialectic had
already marked Eastern monasticism to a certain extent. It does not seem that
the first groups of ascetics which existed within the local Christian
communities knew of any other rules than the canonical ones which applied to
all Christians. However, as the communities became more organized and their
structures became more complicated, the organization of the common life on the
practical level became the object of a number of prescriptions. In Cappadocia
problems came up when the "fraternities" of St Basil became more organized,
and in his attempts to solve them, he went straight to the Gospel. His answers
to these practical questions were put together as a sort of
"collection," and thus arose his "Rules" which have nothing
at all about them which ressembles a systematically elaborated juridical code.
To respond to the various
material and spiritual needs of his monasteries, and also to assure the smooth
running of the common life, St Pachomius was obliged to draw up a certain
number of prescriptions for his monks which also were assembled as
"collections," even during his lifetime. But Pachomius took care to
concentrate the ascetical efforts of his monks on "the prescriptions of
the Gospel," and to orient their attention towards the fundamental spiritual
reality of fraternal communion. After his death, his two successors, Horsiesius
and Theodore, in their attempts to maintain unity in the Congregation, put much
too much emphasis on fidelity to the precepts which Pachomius had drawn up for
the monks, The juridical element replaced the charismatic, and this was the
cause of a rapid decline in the Pachomian congregation.
Generally speaking, in the East
all the ancient rules are considered as a treasure common to the whole of
monasticism. They are spiritual documents which one finds in all the
monasteries. By their contact with these various rules, the young monks develop
"a monk's heart." They do not look to them for directives about the
organization of their monasteries on the level of practical detail. Doing that is
rather the role of the typicon which, ideally at least, should be proper
to each monastery.
Even Cassian, great theorizer
about the monastic life though he was, does not seem to have written a Rule. He
simply presented to the Western monks, by means of his Institutions and
Conferences, the customs and spiritual teachings of the Eastern monks. But more
elaborate rules were drawn up in the West. One of them, the Rule of the Master
which was probably put together by a Roman cleric, served as base for the Rule
of St Benedict. The author of this Rule. the Benedictus vir of Monte Cassino,
presented to his monks the traditional monastic teaching and he did it with
rather unusual wisdom and great discretion. At the same time, he drew up a
picture of how they should live this traditional teaching in the concrete
circumstances of life in an Italian monastery during the sixth century.
For the next few centuries, the
attitude in the West toward monastic rules was similar to that which existed in
the East. Little by little, the Rule of St Benedict found its way into almost
all the monasteries in the West. This, however, does not mean that the other
rules were discarded. Rather, in any given monastery, the monks might have been
using several rules simultaneously for their spiritual orientation. No one even
thought about conforming the details of daily monastic life to the
prescriptions of one or another of these rules[8].
Charlemagne, who wished to rule
the Church as well as serve it, imposed the Rule of St Benedict on all the
monasteries of his realm. It would seem that, in the circumstances in which
monasticism found itself at that time, the only way of reestablishing a certain
"rectitude of life" (precisely that honestas morum about which
St Benedict speaks in Chapter Seventy-three of the Rule) was to impose a
uniform Rule on the monasteries. Benedict of Aniane, supported by Louis the
Pious, put himself to this task with great energy. A Capitulare monasticum-which
constituted actually an adaptation of the Rule of St Benedict-was established
at Aix-la-Chapelle in 817, and the emperor designated inspectors who were
responsible for putting the new decrees into effect. One abbey, Inde, was even
set up as a "model" monastery. This organization was an ephemeral
thing and did not last far beyond Benedict of Aniane's lifetime. During the
ninth century, monasticism again fell into a period of decadence. It became
evident that a mere reform of institutions, even one based on an excellent
Rule, would never be enough if the Spirit was lacking.
But the Spirit was going to
inspire a great spiritual renewal about a century after the Synod of
Aix-la-Chapelle: the reform of Cluny. Working within the juridical framework
established by Benedict of Aniane, this reform was to be a return to the
fundamental monastic observances: silence, work, stability, prayer. It is true
that Cluny developed a liturgical cult which was exaggerated, but the
criticisms directed at Cluny on this score are often exaggerated, too. The
monasteries of the Cluny Federation were real centers of prayer and union with
God existing in the midst of a world marked more than ever by violence,
immorality, and injustice. And they remained centers of intense prayer for a
very long time.
Obviously, the Rule of St
Benedict was the basis of the Cluniac reform, for it was the basis of all
western monasticism at that time. But it was interpreted with discretion and
wisdom by the Abbot of Cluny who was the superior of all the monks of the
"Congregation." Cluny's centralization had drawbacks, of course, as
any kind of centralization does. It also had advantages. Besides freeing the
individual monasteries from feudal domination, it permitted the first abbots of
Cluny (who were great spiritual masters and nearly all of whom were abbots for
a very long time) to exercise a direct spiritual influence on thousands of
monks, and thus to maintain a very high degree of spiritual life in several
hundred monasteries (more than a thousand, when Hugh died in 1109).
The wave of reform which
manifested itself in monasticism toward the middle of the eleventh century
cannot be taken as an indication that Cluny was in a state of decadence. On the
contrary, it bears witness to the success of the Cluniac reform and to the
vitality of a type of monasticism which had attained a sufficient degree of
maturity to give rise within itself to a new need for something better, for a
reform which would be more profound and more radical. just about everywhere,
and at the same time, there appeared a strong desire and movement toward a monastic
life which would be poorer, more simple and more solitary than the life in the
huge Cluniac monasteries, although these abbeys had played an admirable role
during their period of history. From this current which, as a whole, wanted to
be faithful to the Rule of St Benedict (that is to be authentically monastic),
there arose the foundations of Camaldoli, Vallombrosa, Grandmont, Fontevrault,
Chartreuse, Molesme, Cîteaux. They all drew their life from the same movement
of the Spirit. They did not look for a new interpretation of the Rule of St
Benedict. They simply wanted to live, in an authentic way, each one according
to his own manner and with great spontaneity, what everyone recognized as the
life intended by St Benedict: a life that was simple and poor, a life of
solitude.
The original attitude of the
founders of Cîteaux was marked by this spontaneity and this simplicity. Soon,
however, the needs of self-justification brought on by their polemics with the
Benedictine monks obliged them to explain why they had abandoned the
traditional customs which for so long had been taken to be an official
interpretation of the Rule in the West. They had opted for a stricter
observance of the Rule, a literal observance even. It is important to make a
clear distinction between the charism and initial spiritual aspirations of the
founders of Cîteaux, and their self-justifying rationalizations.
As long as the first founders
were alive, and even during the next generation, the vitality of the initial
charism was strong enough to counterbalance any excessive rigidity or
strictness occasioned by the principle of literal observance of all the
prescriptions of the Rule to the exclusion of all the monastic customs which
had developed after the Rule was written. St Bernard, even though he inclined
to absolute principles such as those he puts forth in the De praecepto et
dispensatione, also knew how to exercise common sense, reasoning and charity on
the practical level. Unfortunately, it is more difficult to transmit the charism
of discretion than it is to transmit absolute principles.
The growth of Cîteaux was rapid
and prolific. We have a right to be proud of it. But the historian who is going
to be honest cannot conceal the fact that this Golden Age was very brief (much
shorter than that of Cluny, for example). Very soon we see that a number of
practices directly opposed to the original intentions of the founders were
introduced. The Cistercian monasteries became just as rich as those of Cluny.
After having rejected the Customs of Cluny as so many unjustifiable additions
to the Rule, the Cistercians found that their Customs were more numerous and
complex than those of Cluny! They so forgot about the simplicity of their
predecessors and the sharp criticisms of St Bernard, that the Cistercian
Abbots, a few centuries later, sought to obtain, and in fact did obtain, the
pontifical insignia. The lay brothers were often exploited, and the monks,
counting on them for their material subsistence, often fell into an idleness
which was not at all akin to mystical otium.
What were the causes of this
rapid diminution of the primitive ideal? The principal reason usually given is
that the growth, both in the number of monks and of monasteries, was too rapid.
But we must look for a deeper reason, and 1 am inclined to believe that it is
rather the legalism which resulted from pushing the principle of literal
fidelity to the Rule too far. The fundamental obligations of the monastic life:
poverty, solitude, prayer, make demands on the monk which are almost unlimited.
When the monk applies himself to listening for the promptings of the Holy
Spirit, he is led by him into an ever-deepening understanding of these demands,
and also to a more authentic monastic life on the practical level. But when he
establishes himself in a static position by a literal observance of a text that
has been written once and for all, he is no longer sensitive to the dynamic
action of the Holy Spirit. He no longer obeys the law which is "written in
his heart", but is satisfied with conforming his actions to some exterior
law. And God knows how fertile the human imagination is when it comes to
devising a harmony between the text of a rule and certain things which are most
opposed to its spiritual dynamism.
This legalism was a great
hindrance to the flowering of charisms. The great Cistercian authors such as
William of St Thierry, Guerric of Igny, Amadeus of Lausanne, Aelred of
Rievaulx, Isaac of Stella and Adam of Perseigne, practically all belonged to
the same generation. Most of them had received their formation before they came
to a Cistercian monastery. Even though their spiritual works are very often of
great value, only a relatively small number of these works have a character
which is specifically monastic.
The Charter of Charity, which had
as its goal the union of monasteries in the bond of charity, had seen
uniformity of observances as a means of maintaining this union of charity. But
as the order spread throughout Europe, the General Chapters were continually
harassed by this question of observances. They continually had to be giving
reminders about them, or modifying them, or mitigating them. The Rule itself is
very rarely mentioned in the Acts of the General Chapters.
By the fifteenth century, the
Order had become a vast organism without sufficient life-breath to permit a
reform which would have revived the whole. At that moment God raised up certain
charismatic men who reformed their own monasteries, and around their own
monasteries grouped other houses of monks. This was how several of the
Congregations began. The duration of their prosperity depended on whether they
clung to and kept alive the original charism of the founder, or whether they
simply went about observing the rules he had established. This was the criterion
that determined whether they lasted for a longer or shorter time.
A charism, of course, because of
its very nature can not be "institutionalized." But all the same,
adequate institutions are needed to maintain life in the dynamism which has
been set in motion. This passage from charism to institution is always an
extremely delicate matter. Unfortunately it is often a passage to legalism.
That is clearly what happened in the case of the Pachomian congregation, under
Horsiesius and Theodore. I feel that at Cîteaux, also, a too-literal attachment
to the customs established by the founders led-after a marvelous but brief
period of developmentto a certain drying-up of Cistercian spirituality.
This phenomenon is common enough.
We can find it outside of monasticism, outside of Christianity even, in Islam
for example. And it appears with a strange sort of similarity. With regard to
Islam, Jacques Jomier has written: "At Medina, during the lifetime of
Mohammed, Islam was a veritable theocracy. At any moment, new oracles might
announce new orders from above to the people. It was God, the faithful
believed, who guided his people, shepherded by their leader. After the death of
Mohammed it is difficult to speak of pure and simple theocracy. The Koran
became the supreme law, and numerous points which had been passed over in
silence were gradually made the object of legislation. Thus a whole body of
legislation came into being. At the time the Arabic empire broke up, Islam had
become, according to the expression of Louis Gardet, a'Nomocracy'."[9]
The following remark by the same
author with reference to Islam, might be applied to more than one phase of
monastic history: "As a religion of law, Islam permits the majority of her
faithful to settle down with a good conscience once they have accomplished all
the prescribed observances. This results in a state of satisfaction and
serenity, except in the case of certain mystics who thirst for the
absolute."[10]
Conclusion: the Rule and
Ourselves
The fundamental obligation of
contemporary monasticism, and that of each individual monk, is to hearken to
the life-giving Spirit, in an attitude of openness and docility. The Spirit
speaks in a million ways, and one of the special channels through which he
reaches us is, of course, the Rule. But to discover the message of the Spirit
in the Rule, we must know how to interpret it. In order to do this, we must
consider it from three different points of view.
As a document of the great Church
tradition, the Rule transmits to us the evangelical doctrine on the perfect
Christian life. From this point of view, it has just as much value for the
Christian in general as it has for the monk himself It is one of many documents
in which and by which the Church has objectified, during the course of the
ages, its understanding of the Gospel. Obviously, it is not meant to replace
the Gospel-a misunderstanding which might result from clumsy usage of the
expression: "The Rule: digest of the Gospel." Rather, its goal is to
help us better understand the requirements of the Gospel.
As a document of the monastic
tradition, the Rule teaches monks of all eras and all persuasions the
fundamental spiritual attitude which makes the monk. The first obligation of
the monk with respect to the Rule is, therefore, to meditate on it unceasingly,
to let himself be penetrated with it, and to let it create in him the spiritual
attitude which will make him a real monk. And it is through his personal and
vital experience, much more than through abstract formulas, that he will arrive
at expressing what this state of soul is-this attitude toward God, toward man,
toward created things, which characterizes the monk. One might describe this
attitude in general terms this way: the monk is a man who has abandoned, as far
as is humanly possible, everything which men are wont to consider helpful for
organizing their life on this earth. He has put himself in an impossible
situation; that is to say, in a situation where he must count on God for
everything, where he can no longer count on anyone or anything but him. That is
the significance of his solitude, his poverty, and his celibacy.
The Rule presents this spiritual
attitude to him, not in an abstract form, but incarnated in customs and
practices, in a type of daily life intimately linked to a specific historical
context. Thus it takes the form of a juridical code.
As a document of Church
tradition, the Rule of St Benedict has an unquestionable value for all
Christians and its interpretation is subject to the same rules as any other
document of the Church. As a witness of the monastic tradition, it has a value
for all monks, but particularly for those who belong to the great cenobitic
tradition which the Rule has handed down to our day. As a juridical code
describing the concrete realization of this spiritual attitude in a detailed
way and in a setting of daily life, the Rule had an immediate value as norm
only for the monks for whom it was first written, those living in the time of
St Benedict, although even from this secondary point of view it continues to
give inspiration to monks through the centuries.
The task of the monastic orders,
and the task of each individual monk, then, is to try earnestly to arrive at a
comprehension ever new and ever deeper of what the Gospel requires of man, and
to continue the renewal of their spiritual orientation and the dynamism which
characterizes monastic life. Under the guidance of the Spirit they must
unceasingly seek for the most authentic and true concrete realization of this
spiritual attitude, in forms of life adapted to our living contemporary
context. Take an example: evangelical poverty. The Rule, drawn up in a
sociological context completely different from ours, cannot teach us how we
should practice poverty today. But it should create in our hearts a spirit of
poverty. And if we are really poor in spirit, we will certainly practice a
poverty which is authentic. If, on the other hand, we are just concerned with
observing the Rule's precepts telling us what we should do with our earthly
goods, we may easily justify, in the name of fidelity to the Rule, all sorts of
situations which, in our contemporary context, are frowned upon by the consensus
Ecclesiae as being contrary to evangelical poverty.
Another example: prayer. The
exigencies of the Gospel with regard to prayer are, quite clearly, the same for
all Christians. The Rule simply reminds us of them. But it is normal that the
monk, who lives in the presence of God and for him alone, should consecrate a
greater part of his time to prayer, and especially if he is a cenobite to a
public expression of his prayer in union with his brethren. The Rule teaches
him how to establish an organic unity between private and communal prayer. It
also teaches him how to integrate times of communal prayer into the general
framework of community life. This is the fundamental cenobitic attitude which
the Rule teaches us, and we will never be able fully to sound its depths.
In addition to all this, St
Benedict describes the structure which these times of communal prayer should
have, and he does this by means of a detailed juridical code. What he
prescribed was based on the Roman liturgical customs of his day, and,
obviously, he took into consideration the spiritual needs of his monks, their
cultural level, and the rhythm of daily life in the Italian countryside during
the sixth century. We can see that fidelity to the Rule of St Benedict cannot
consist in slavishly copying these structures which are so closely bound to an
historical context of the past. It consists, rather, in taking its spirit
so that we can, in our turn, express our common experience of the Mystery of
Christ through our worship, taking into consideration the theological mentality
and the liturgical tradition of our twentieth-century Church. It will mean also
taking into consideration our own particular spiritual needs as influenced by
our sociological and psychological context, and thus arrive at the rhythm of
life of an authentic contemporary monasticism.
The task of reinterpretation of
the Rule and of monastic renewal which has the contours I have just described
cannot be the work of theorists. It ought to spring from the spiritual
experience of the monastic orders and communities themselves. And to pursue
such a work what we need above all is persons of spiritual greatness,
charismatic men and women who know how to breathe a new dynamism into the
monastic orders. Structural reforms are often necessary, sometimes to favor the
flowering of charisms, sometimes for preserving the fruits of these charism.
But the monastic history shows us that a juridical reform remains fruitless
unless it receives its lifebreath from the Holy Spirit.
Armand
Veilleux ocso
Abbey of Mistassini,
Village-des-Pères, P.Q., Canada
[1] published in : The Cistercian Spirit. A Symposium in Memory of Thomas Merton, edited by M. Basil Pennington, Spencer 1970, pp. 48-65.
[1]
Minutes of the Sessions of the Sixtieth
General Chapter: Order of Cistercians of the Strict Observance (Dubuque, Iowa: Regional
Conference, U.S.A., 1967), p. 102.
[2] . B. Lonergan, "Theology in
its new context" in Theology of Renewal, Vol. I (Montreal, 1968),
pp. 37f.
[3] Here
I have used as my basis M. Löhrer, "Überlegungen zur Interpretation
lehramtlicher Aussagen als Frage des ökumenischen Gesprächs" in Gott in
Welt (Freiburg-Basel-Vienna, 1964), pp. 499-523.
[4] Cf.
G. Krüger, Freiheit und Weltverantwortung (Freiburg, 1958).
[5] Cf.
M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Berlin, 1926).
[6] Cf.
H. G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen, 196o).
[7] I explained this in detail in my
article "The Abbatial Office in Cenobitic Life" in Monastic
Studies, no. 6 (1968), pp. 3-45.
[8] . See J. Hourlier, "La Règle de St Benoît,
source du droit monastique" in Etudes d'histoire du Droit Canonique
(Paris. Aubier, 1967), pp. 157-168.
[9] . J. Jomier, Introduction a I'Islam actuel
(Paris, 1964), pp. 29f.
[10] Ibid., p. 194.