Capt. P.Woinin
Created : 27 October 1997
Last updated : 8 July 1998
This page will be upgraded each time new information becomes available in order to
propose a global view of the events. More details, remarks and corrections are welcome.
However the first reports available all tend to blame both master while enhancing the
appropriate warnings of the VTS. Since the main enquiry will take place in Singapore,
which is also the authority running of the VTS system, in spite of the rather good fairness of
the country various administrative systems, among them justice, there is always a risk that
their judgment will be biased towards the culpability of the foreign masters.
On 28 October the Dutch TV 1 broadcasted a nice reportage on the most deadly crash of the
aviation history, the collision of two Boeing 747 in Teneriffe the 27 March 1997. While
gathering speed for take off, the KLM plane hit the Pan Am jumbos still taxying on the
same runway. Three contradictory investigations took place. The Spanish and the American
reached almost the same conclusion about the main cause of the accident: a human error
from the Dutch pilot. But the Dutch enquiry denied this, and put the blame on a wrong
manoeuvre of the Pan Pilot (When instructed to leave the runway at exit 3, he used 4, but in
fact lost no time in the process as exit 3 involved a slow 135° turn.). Finally the Dutch are
now starting to acknowledge that one of their best pilot made a tragic bad decision to
initiate the take off in poor visibility before having received full clearance from the control
tower. The Dutch have not the reputation to live in a "face saving" culture, but it took
them nearly two decades to acknowledge facts which were almost obvious from the
black boxes records. What are then the chances to reach the a good level of objectivity in a
collision between large vessels in which no black boxes are available but where huge
pollution cleaning costs are at stake?
However any parallel between shipping and aviation must stop here, because the shipping
VTS handle a total different problem than the air traffic controllers. These last have the
possibility to direct a plane and keep it at as safe distance of others, thanks to the huge space
available in the sky. Large ships come much closer to each other, are often manoeuvring in
constricted waters, are subject to currents and many other peculiar factors not affecting planes.
The main recommendation after the Teneriffe tragedy was a better Team work inside the
cockpit. The main recommendation here, will be a better Team work between the wheel
house staff, and the VTS, and the main shipping bodies.
(Although the control tower of Teneriffe did not make any mistake, without knowing
anything about taxi procedures, I wonder if such a dangerous situation as two planes using
the same runway in poor visibility would not require more clear warnings, and perhaps a
conspicuous signalization system.)
BA 2833 details around the accident area (Karang Banteng).
Chart BA 2833 purchased a few days after the accident, and corrected to BA notice
1997/3566.
15 october 2041
VTS warning ORAPIN GLOBAL that she crossed the buffer zone of the westbound lane.
ORAPIN GLOBAL acknowledged, stating that she was overtaking a slower vessel and that
she will come back after this manoeuvre.
In this area the westbound lane is less than 3 cables wide (556 meters/608 yards). But all the shipping traffic going from the Far East to India, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe has to proceed through this narrow channel.
The buffer zone between the West and eastbound lane is only about one cable wide (185mtr/202yards) The eastbound lane is divided in two parts. The one close to the buffer zone is the Deep Water Route, reserved for deep drafts vessels, is 3.5 cables wide.
The outer part is from 6 to 4 cables wide, but many small crafts and tows are proceeding in the wrong direction between Batu BERHANTI and Karang BATENG in order to make a shorter passage between the Eastern Part of the Strait and Selat DURIAN or other destinations in the Southern part of the area. I have no experience or report that the VTS does mention these contravening ships. Their presence often compel the eastbound vessels to sail closer to the deep water route, or even use it.
15 October 2046
The VTS warned once more the ORAPIN GLOBAL of a risk of collision at 2046 with the EVOIKOS.
15 October 2048.
The VTS warned the EVOIKOS about a risk of collision with the ORAPIN GLOBAL. A
that time the EVOIKOS was about to proceed to the Southern Pilot boarding ground,
roughly one mile away.
Both ships acknowledged the warnings from the VTS.
However they are no reports that the VTS advised the ORAPIN GLOBAL about the size, draft and destination of the EVOIKOS. All these elements are paramount to assess the correct manoeuvre in an imminent risk of collision exists.
15 October 2054
The collision occurred at 2054 about five kilometres/three miles south of Pulau SEBAROK,
or 1 mile north of Karang BATENG. Three cargo tanks ruptured spilling 28,463 tons or
some 30 million liters/seven million gallons of oil and the ship anchored three
kilometres/two miles southeast of Pulau Sebarok. Damage includes a gash on the port side
50 meters/164 feet long and 10 meters/32 feet wide, from the deck to below the waterline.
Visibility at the time of the collision was eight kilometres/five miles.
At the time of collision the ORAPIN GLOBAL was travelling at no less than 10 knots.
Clean-up of the spill has involved 57 vessels and a helicopter and oil has been removed from the Jong, Pandan and Sinki Fairways, the Western Anchorage and anchorages in the West Jurong area. Oil has also been reported at Selat Puah Anchorage, West Jurong Anchorage and Selat Sultan Shoal Lighthouse. Six oil spill experts from Japan are also assisting with two recovery systems. Two representatives of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund are also on-scene. At last report, a slick 33 kilometres/20 miles long was in the southern Strait of Malacca and nearing Malaysia between Pulau PISANG and Pulau LYU Kechil Light. More than a kilometer/0.6 miles of containment booms had been laid along Johor.
17 October
EVOIKOS owners stated they signed Lloyd's Open form salvage contract with TSALIRIS,
which sub-contracted Singapore Based SEMCO for the anti-pollution operations. Damaged
tanker held by local tugs BRITOIL 17 and BRITOIL 18. First transfer of oil from damaged
tanks to tanker LHK II.
20 October
The two masters are arrested by the Singapore police. CHEN TZE PENN, Director-General
of Singapore's Maritime & Port Authority (MPA) could not give specific details on what
specific offences are involved.
22 October
The two masters are charged with reckless navigation.
CHAKITIS is accused of a breach of duty, failing to reduce speed and preventing the
EVOIKOS from being seriously damaged under the Singapore Merchant Shipping Act. He
could be sentenced to two years in prison, a fine of Singapore $50,000/U.S.$32,000 or both.
SOKOLOWSKI is accused under Singapore's penal code of navigating recklessly,
endangering lives and failing to take action to avoid a collision. He could be sentenced to
six months in prison, a S$1,000/U.S.$600 fine or both.
24 October
Oil is reported as far north as Muar and 600 meters/2,000 feet of booms had been deployed
by four vessels to protect fish and prawn farms. Some 1,100 meters/3,600 feet of boom has
been used in the clean-up. The same day, Malaysia detained the Orapin GLOBAL for
illegally anchoring in its territorial waters near Pulau KUKUP.
Both masters released on bail of S$100,000 (US$64,850).
The spill is now estimated at 29000 tons. An oil slick of 33km now reported to have entered
the Eastern part of the Malacca Strait, menacing fish and prawns farms near Pulau KUKUP,
a popular seafood centre. The shore of the Singapore south western islands of SUDONG,
PAWAI, SENANG and RAFFLES are coated with oil.
29 October
EVOIKOS still at South Boarding Ground.
31 October
Official reports state no major pollution reported in Malacca strait, only a sheen of oil south
of Raffles, apparently coming from polluted islands. Vessels on the contrary are reporting
thick oil patches 15 to 20 miles in length in the southern part of the Malacca strait. The
thickness of oil being 3 to 5 inches at times, heavily clagging the shell of passing ships
from bow to stern. As it will be a near impossible task to clean these hull without stopping
the vessel, and using hanging staging and a lot of chemicals, the masters are fearing
pollution and heavy fines in the next ports of call (Singapore, Hong Kong, Manilla, Japan,
Korea, China.).
7 November
The Singapore Marine & Port authority declares a stand-down of clean-up operations. Some
650 persons, 80 boats and 16 government organisations were involved. The EVOIKOS is
shifted to the Rafles Reserved Anchorage.
22 November
The deputy public prosecutor Wong Keen Onn tells the court that the investigations are
delayed because there is a lack of cooperation of the owner and the crew of the ORAPIN
GLOBAL. This was denied by the ship's lawyer : François Xavier. Captain Sokolowki
applied to leave the country, promizing to come back to serve his sentence if convinced, but
this was rejected by the court. Captain Chaltikis of the EVOIKOS on the contrary prefers to
stay and finish the case. Judge See Kee Oon adjourn the case to 12 December.
13 December
Both master are denied to leave Singapore, even provisionally for the Christmas holidays.
The master of the EVOIKOS is furthermore accused to have failed to keep a proper
look-out. This is strange for a ship about to embark the pilot, and I would like to know more
details about the arguments of the local court.
6 July 1998
The Lloyd's List is now publishing summaries of the court decisions and reports that both
masters are pleading guilty of the charges brought against them facing up to 2 years in jail.
Although Singapore is a much better place to stay and where to be arrested than many other
countries in the area, many seafarers have not the same romantic view of the place as the
tourist staying in the Shangri-la, and would be ready to admit almost everything if this is
connected to a discrete promise of a milder sentence. But there can be more behind this
good cooperation with the court.
With the few new facts made available now, I would not change much my previous
assessment of the causes of the collision, stating that the role of the VTIS needs to be
further considered. If the ORAPIN GLOBAL was first informed at 2040 hrs (2041 in the
first reports) that she was in the wrong lane, there is no mention that the VTIS advised her
of the EVOIKOS having the take a pilot ahead of her before 2048, only 6 minutes before
the collision. Neither there is any mention of a warning by the VTIS to the EVOIKOS about
a risk of collision with the West bound tanker. As approaching a pilot station accross the
TSS in Singapore with a laden tanker is a kind of Russian roulette, the VTIS should provide
the Masters involved with the necessary information about meeting traffic.
Once the vessels were confronted with other, free from any other traffic interference, taking
into account ther actual heading and inertia, a red to red maneuver was likely the most
appropriate, but again as the ORAPIN GLOBAL was almost compelled to join back its lane
by the VTIS, while finally altering to port once the heading of the EVOIKOS was initially
found to be to the West, this confused situation lead to the collision. A fast exchange
between the Masters without any other VTIS interference than putting them in contact could
have been the best procedure to agree on this difficult meeting.
The fundamental reasons of this strange development are possibly clarified by this small article published in the same Lloyd's List issue: "Both guilty pleas were a surprise and cut short what had been expected to be a long and complicated trial... Lawyers involved in the case said the scene was now set for the second round of trials for civil claims and counter-claims for compensation." Without prejudicing of the fairness of the trial, it remains that the local authorities are somewhat judge and party here. If the VTIS could bear the slightest part of responsibility in this collision, this second round of trial would follow a complete different development. It is also true that for the respective owners/managers the admission of negligence by the masters is the best option to protect them. With so much money involved, a few years wages do not matter much any more. The career of those two unfortunate seafarers is most likely terminated just as if they dared to implement the ISM Code following their own judgment. We shall never know what lies behind the scene, which are the reward a possible agreement satisfactory to most parties involved, even the skippers themselves. The only victim will be once more the truth about the exact causes of the accident, and the future casualties from a similar collision as very little risk to be learned from this one.
The masters were both charged with reckless navigation, in spite of continuous warning
from the shipmasters community that the VTS system was poorly enforced in this area.
From the reports, it is clear that the EVOIKOS was near the buffer zone to prepare her
crossing of the westbound lane in order to reach the pilot station. It is not yet clear if she
actually started to change course to achieve this difficult manoeuvre. Most radar systems
need several sweeps to detect such a change of course, it could be the case of the shore
based radar of the VTS, and for sure the one on board the ORAPIN GLOBAL. Even if this
change of course of the EVOIKOS was not yet achieved, the simple fact that she put her
wheel in this direction would have involved a loss of a precious minute if a counter order
was suddenly given to come back to starboard in order to avoid the ORAPIN GLOBAL.
Anyway, the buffer zone between the TSS lanes being so small, it is no wonder that the
chance for both tankers to be on a near opposite course was great. It was dark, but even by
day accurate radar positions with shore feature can be hindered by half submerged coral
banks/shoal areas. GPS fixes could be more accurate and faster if the necessary correction
to the WGS datum are pre-programmed or manually applied (0.1 cable Northward and 1.1
cable Eastward there). As the TSS run 068/248, an uncorrected GPS reading gives a
displacement of 0.3 cable across the TSS, or about one third of the buffer zone. However I
received a report that on the larger scale BA chart 2556 the corrections to the WGS84 data
are different, in fact smaller. So good for the exact positioning of the vessel if this chart was
used, but it reveals also a weakness of the actual BA chart system of the area. The change of
settings on the GPS will involve another lost of time, when navigation requires all the
attention of the staff.
Furthermore, the EVOIKOS had to keep clear of the Mid channel buoy and shoal area off
Karang BANTENG (Buffalo rock). At that point she had to cross the westbound lane at
right angle to embark the pilot. As her length was close to two cables, she will occupy
nearly the whole width of the westbound lane for a while. This is a very difficult manoeuvre
for a large laden tanker. Having no priority she had to wait for a gap in the westbound
traffic, but meanwhile the current could keep pushing further East. (Or back West, which
was preferable to keep headway and steerage, it would be interesting to know the direction
of the current at the time of the collision.)
Up to now there are no reports that the VTS advised the ORAPIN GLOBAL about the
destination of the EVOIKOS and the chances that she will cross her course. On the
contrary, it seems that the VTS focused its attention on the correct position of the ORAPIN
GLOBAL inside the lanes, without considering other traffic problems. It is possible that, by
compelling the ORAPIN GLOBAL to quickly position herself inside the narrow westbound
lane, the VTS in fact contributed to the accident.
Let us guess the situation on the bridge of the EVOIKOS. They are not so many options.
Anyway, if the eastbound deep water route was free of other traffic, and considering the
option n°2, it would have been safer for the two vessels to pass green to green (each one
leaving the other on her right side), preferably after a mutual agreement on the VHF, and/or
in coordination with the VTS.
This accident can help to show the shortcomings of many VTS who are seldom manned by
experienced masters or pilots. A simple radar operator cannot possibly help when a
dangerous situation arises. He can do more harm than good, and it happens quite often.
Here a few examples.
In 1987, while approaching IRAKO Suido TSS coming from KINURA, we could easily pass in front of several ships entering ISE wan. But no, our entrance in the TSS was programmed to the minute, and what happened just before or after this moment did not bother the VTS personal. It was not their responsibility, even if our earlier passage in the TSS made no practical difference regarding their responsibility, but it was not planned. Thus we had to make a risky zig-zag in the middle of these ships to respect their planning.
A colleague is coming back from Australia bound to Rotterdam. One radar is out of order, but the visibility is perfect. As the berth will not be free before several days, the charterers ask him to anchor somewhere in Channel. He found a safe anchorage SW of the Casquets. When he is ordered to sail, the second radar fails. But still the visibility is good, he is a good seaman and proceed to the TSS north of the Casquets. However if he proceeds to the TSS west entrance from his position, he would have to make a 130° turn to enter his lane, frightening the other incoming vessels just before this manoeuvre. So logically he decides, to join the TSS with a smooth angle, crossing the inshore lane while doing so. This is good seamanship, but did not please at all a guy controlling from his radar the movements of the vessels in the TSS. His manoeuvre is reported by the French authorities to the Belgian ones. This captain receives as punishment one day suspension of his master licence.
In the early nineties I was leaving FOS with a container vessel, bound for Livorno. On the nautical chart I observe an old course showing that the vessel left the TSS earlier to cross a broad area of free water, and saving a few miles in the process. On the radar and visually there was not a single craft to be seen in the area, thus it was perfectly safe to take this shorter route. Anyway, remembering the above story, I contacted the VTS operator, asking him the authorization to take this course. We both speak French as mother language, so no confusion was possible. However he did not even consider my request. His laconic answer was: "If you do so, I have to report you.". For sure we burned a few hundred liters of fuel stupidly to respect his tunnel vision.
These two last example shows that a master cannot take lightly a transgression of the TSS or the VTS instructions.April 1984. Leaving Gdansk already exhausted by a night without sleep due to the loading operations, poor visibility expected us in the Baltic. If there was any chance to rest for an hour or two, it was destroyed by the necessity to send elaborated and frequent reports to the traffic control of the area. This all the way to Goteborg where we arrived two days later. There I could hardly rest one hour while we took a top up of bunkers. When we left it was still in dense fog. Approaching the entrance of the bay, the radar showed us the target of a vessel proceeding to the south, nearly on a collision course. In order not cross her bow, the safest would be to alter coast to starboard and stay astern. However if that vessel was bound also for Goteborg, she could suddenly change course to starboard also. That was one of the best opportunity to use the VTS who received the reports from all the ships in the Kategat. I called them and asked the destination of this vessel. The VTS had no idea at all. A few minutes later this vessel came to starboard to enter Goteborg. Luckily we had kept our initial course.
Eight years later, I related this incident to a Danish pilot bringing us through the Sund. He confirmed that since long he did not report any more. This after he sailed in dense fog with a empty tanker not yet gas free, he reported all his positions but his dangerous ship was the only forgotten in the VTS reports.After the collision between the WESTERN WINNER and the BRITISH TRENT, in which 9 seafarers lost their lives, the Belgian VTS system in the Wandelaar approaches was the object of severe critics by the British shipping press. At least the pilot station had been moved since to a far safer area as far as the large vessels are concerned.
Up to now, I found that only some German VTS system are efficient because they are manned by pilots. Generally the VTS should limit itself to the supply of useful information, should not request elaborated reports every 10 minutes, should not give strict instructions to the master, should facilitate bridge to bridge contact between vessels, and above all it must be manned by a competent master or pilot, who can quickly assess the validity of an urgent request from a vessel in a difficult situation.
In this collision however, the master of both ships were quickly arrested, assuming as
quickly they were reckless while the Singapore VTS did a perfect job. The unfair attitude of
the Singaporean authorities regarding both masters should be condemned it does not reflect
a decent behaviour from a nation which owes so much to the seafaring community.
I can support this view of an unfortunate suspicious attitude against seafarers with my own
experience.
However, if after further information all the above is confirmed and it becomes obvious that the accident was partly provoked by the VTS, the personal in charge cannot be blamed to have acted at the limit of its competence and liberty of action. If the VTS received from the authorities the instruction to keep the large vessels in the TSS lanes without regard for any other consideration, the guy in charge did his job. But the instructions were wrong, or the whole system. It is the point of this article.
This accident shows also that the ISM Code in its present implementation, and an eventual
passage planning, cannot help much to prevent this kind of collision.
On the contrary, if the shipping bodies had better listened to the concern of masters,
expressed so many times, dangerous pilot boarding grounds, ineffective VTS, conflicts in
COLREGs, poor bridge to bridge communication systems, and many other problems which
had probably contributed to this collision would have been improved since long. For many
masters it is obvious that they meet a lot of hazardous conditions all over the world, and
they must be encouraged to report them as often as possible. Any organisation gathering
these reports (MARS?) should then summarize them and advise the authorities concerned
that their port approaches can labelled "UNSAFE" if a serious traffic control is not enforced.
The MPA stated that there was no (traffic) congestion, but from the present reports we
know that they are at least 3 ships involved. When large vessels are involved in restricted
waters, a rare and peculiar combination of courses and speed can lead to a situation where
collision could hardly been avoided by the skills of the masters alone, except perhaps if they
had been since long in communication with each other. But here, one vessel had to cross the
opposite lane, and the timing of this manoeuvre was essential.
Therefore, if the local VTS has to be used anyway, one possible recommendation is for the
VTS to organise and enforce a stoppage of this westbound traffic the time needed for a large
laden vessel to cross the westbound lane.
An additional option available to the VTS, thanks to its global view of the traffic, is to
allow some westbound vessels to enter provisionally the eastbound deep water route once it
gave to a deep draft ship the green light to cross the westbound lane. But this will involve
giving more responsibilities to highly qualified VTS operators, a big change in the actual practices.
Anyway, each VTS should be at the same time tough enough to enforce strictly the TSS for
all vessels, independently of their size, and be able to show enough initiative to allow a
vessel making a difficult maneuver to transgress the TSS limits.
While most staffs have to cope with many electronic gadgets on the radar, the one badly
missing is an efficient display of other vessels characteristics and maneuver. The suggestion
of many staff and shore bodies converge to this point but very little is done, or even studied.
Beyond the passive transponder, the technology is there for each ship to send permanently a
short signal showing its characteristics, course, intentions, and even its call sign. Voice or
digital contact will be then much easier.
A few years ago it was nearly impossible to make a call on the VHF in the Singapore area.
Then the situation drastically improved because the pilots were all equipped with a digital
VHF. But the large vessels are still fighting to send their voice message on one or two VHF frequencies.
Sooner or later the vessels will be equipped with a black box. Presently they are several
recorders on the bridge, among them one showing headings the vessels. These are useful in
case of collision or grounding, but they hardly reflect the orders given and the competence
of the wheelman. Controversies on the precise wheel movements are still going for the
EXXON VALDEZ, the BORGA, the SEA EMPRESS, the MOBY PRINCE, the
MINERAL DAMPIER & HANJIN MADRAS among others. The actual computer
technology would allow to record easily the following parameters: the status of the
hand/automatic steering, all the rudder angles applied by the wheelman/autopilot, the
effective (and delayed) response of the rudder and for sure, as before, the resulting heading
of the vessel. A record of the GPS/DGPS positions would certainly be necessary.
In this case, the necessity for both vessels to remain/return inside a narrow TSS lane possibly lead to the collision. But they are also many other case where vessels sailing along a TSS have to give to cross traffic and can be compelled to leave the TSS for this purpose. As long as the navigating officers have to fear being shouted at by a VTS tyrant, or/and loosing their tickets for a while, or/and transgressing one of the conflicting COLREG rules, their liberty to carry out the safest manoeuvre will be seriously handicapped.
SINGAPORE
MALAYSIA, INDONESIA
Lloyd's List, Steve Schultz World Maritime News, Singapore Shipping Times web pages,
BA Chart 3833 corrected up to NtM 1997/3566, Email, Marine-L, personal experience,
reports from colleagues.
