Page normale sans titre

THE “MIRACLE” OF DUNKIRK RECONSIDERED

CHURCHILL’S LIES AND DECEPTION

On May 28, 1940, the Belgian Army, under the command of King Leopold III, having fought until the last round, put down the arms. This resulted in a fierce campaign of slander and hatred feelings against Belgium, not only in France but also in Great-Britain.

Paul Reynaud (President of the French Council) and Winston Churchill (Prime minister of Great-Britain), both accused King Leopold and the Belgian Army of treason and the failure of the military operations in may 1940. Ever since, and until this day, this fairytale (better said: this black legend) is still spread by certain “authors”.

One should however remember that Churchill, already on May 22, 1940, decided to withdraw the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from France. He, however, instructed General Lord Gord to deceive the Allies (France and Belgium) with the aim of keeping them fighting.

The Belgian Army fought meanwhile an extra five (5) days until total exhaustion. This provided the BEF the necessary time to flee to Great-Britain.

These are the true historical facts.

In 1980, Nicholas Harmon wrote his book “The miracle of Dunkirk reconsidered”, which was published by Simon & Shuster, New York. ISBN: 0-671-25389-1 $ 12.95

Charles Lutton, an American historian of the “Institute for Historical Review”, wrote in 1981, in the “Journal of Historical Review”, a remarkable summary of Harmon’s book. (See next)

Louis Van Leemput

THE “MIRACLE” OF DUNKIRK RECONSIDERED

(By Charles Lutton)

Forty one years ago nearly 340,000 British and French troops were evacuated from the besieged port of Dunkirk. At the time the event was portrayed by the British government and press as a kind of victory. The “Spirit of Dunkirk” became a powerful instrument to help sustain morale at home and rally support abroad. Though a number of perceptive military analysts arrived at a more sophisticated understanding of Dunkirk years ago, the war-time version of the event is still repeated, not only in popular literature, but in college texts as well.

Nicholas Harmon, a British journalist and broadcaster, has written a noteworthy study of the Dunkirk episode that goes well beyond previous accounts. In preparing his major revision of Dunkirk, the author consulted Cabinet papers, war diaries, and other newly released documents that had been kept secret for over thirty years under Britain’s Official Secrets Act.

Harmon had anticipated retelling the familiar story in modern form. But, in the light of the previously unavailable records, he found that “as I proceeded the simple truths began to slide away”.

Reviewing events from the German invasion of Western Europe on May 1940 to the decision of the British government to withdraw its forces from the continent, Harmon discovered that the long-held assertion that Britain was let down by her French and Belgian allies is a myth.

Although the Allies outnumbered their German opponents, including superiority in tanks, Hitler’s generals employed innovative tactics to subdue their more numerous enemies.

On 22 May, Churchill’s Cabinet decided to retire the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from France. Anthony Eden formally ordered the commander of the BEF, General Lord Gord, to deceive his Allies about the British Army’s intention to retreat.

Churchill contributed to the deception by reassuring French Premier Reynaud that Britain was firmly committed to victory. Even as the British prepared to evacuate, they tried to convince the Belgians to continue to fight. The Belgians did remain on the field of battle for an additional five days, which delayed the advance of German Army Group B toward Dunkirk.

As the author points out, “Far from being betrayed by their Allies, the British military commanders in France and Belgium practiced on them a methodical deception which enabled the British to get away with their rear defended”.

Harmon’s research disclosed that the British were responsible for crimes against both German soldiers and Allied civilians. Some British troops were supplied with dumdum bullets – lethal missiles expressly banned by the Geneva Convention on the rules of war.

London issued directives to take no prisoners except when they specifically needed captive Germans for interrogation. For this reason British Tommies feared being captured because “they supposed that the enemy’s orders would be the same as their own”.

On 27 May ninety prisoners of the Norfolk Regiment were killed by members of the SS Totenkopf Division and on 28 May over eighty men of the Warwickshire Regiment were executed by troops of the SS Adolf Hitler Regiment.

These acts were committed in retaliation for the massacre of large numbers of men of the SS Totenkopf Division who had surrendered to the British.

French and Belgian civilians fared little better than the Germans in the hands of the British confederates. Looting was common and “stealing from civilians soon became official policy”.

British military authorities executed, without trial, civilians suspected of disloyalty.

In one instance, reports Harmon, the Grenadier Guards shot seventeen suspected “fifth columnists” at Helchin.

The perpetrators of these war crimes were apparently not disciplined or placed on trial, as were German soldiers later charged with similar acts.

The evacuation from Dunkirk, codename “operation Dynamo”, commenced on 26 May. It was originally hoped that up to 45,000 men might be rescued. The actual total came to 338,000.

Lord Gord was instructed not to inform his French and Belgian colleagues that the evacuation was beginning.

South-east of Dunkirk the British withdrew their units, leaving seven French divisions alone to face the advancing Germans. The French fought on until their ammunition was exhausted and managed, like the Belgians, to tie down German forces that would otherwise have been available to assault the perimeter of Dunkirk.

As British and French troops retired toward Dunkirk, Admiral Sir B.H. Ramsey organized the sea lift to England. After the French government protested, a written order was issued commanding that the French troops be embarked in equal numbers with the British. In practice this was not carried out. Harmon records that when Frenchmen tried to board boats on the beach, Royal Navy shore parties organized squads of soldiers with fixed bayonets to keep them back. On at least one occasion a British platoon fired on French troops attempting to embark. Only after practically all the British had escaped were efforts made to evacuate the remaining French soldiers. But when the port surrendered to the Germans on 3 June, over 40,000 French soldiers were captured.

Perhaps the most memorable aspect of the evacuation was the role played by civilians in their small boats. Harmon explains that this is just part of the myth. The British public was not informed that an evacuation was underway until 6 pm on 31 May.

A Small Vessels Pool, based on Sheerness, did assemble a large number of small civilian craft. But most of them were useless for evacuation work. Only on the last two days of the withdrawal did civilian volunteers play a role in rescuing an additional 26,500 men from the beaches.

Their contribution, notes the author, “was gallant and distinguished; but it was not significant in term of numbers rescued”

Harmon re-examined the on-going controversy concerning Hitler’s order of 24 May, halting for two days the German advance in the Direction of Dunkirk. After the war some German officers claimed that they were “shocked” when they received the order to stop their tanks at the river Aa, which permitted the French to establish a defensive line on the west side of Dunkirk.

At the time, however, Panzer General Heinz Guderian visited his leading units on the approaches to Dunkirk and concluded that General von Rundstedt had been right to order a halt and that further tank attacks across the wet land (which had been claimed from the sea) would have involved a useless sacrifice of some of his best troops.

In his post-war memoirs and discussions with Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Guderian tried to blame Hitler for the suspension of the advance.

From his discussions with Guderian and other German generals, Liddell Hart concluded that Hitler permitted the British Army to escape on purpose, hoping that this generous act would facilitate the conclusion of peace with Britain.

A number of years ago it became clear that the order to stop the advance of the German Panzer units had been expected for some time. General von Rundstedt finally issued that order on 24 May which Hitler simply confirmed.

The troops were allowed to rest and local repairs were carried out on the armoured vehicles. When the offensive resumed on 26 May the German priorities had shifted and the focus of the attack was Paris and the heartland of the country where a large body of French troops remained. Dunkirk was regarded as a sideshow. German Air Force units were assigned to bombard Dunkirk, but the weather there was generally unsuitable for flying and during the nine days of the evacuation the Luftwaffe interfered with it only two-and-a-half days: 27 May, the afternoon of 29 May and on 1 June.

Nicholas Harmon’s study shows that an event which has long been celebrated as one of the greatest triumphs in British history was, in fact, a major defeat. The evacuation of a third of a million men was a unique achievement, but a military catastrophe nonetheless.

In de-mythologizing Dunkirk, he has made a contribution to our understanding of the Second World War.

“ The prisoner at Laeken

King Leopold

Legend and fact ”

This is the title of a book, written by Professor Emile Cammaerts, published in June 1940 at London by Shenval Press.

The preface to the book was written by Sir Roger Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet, BT., G.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O.

This superior officer was, at the outbreak of the war on 10^th may 1940, appointed by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, as special liaison officer to King Leopold III. He stayed with the King until the evening before the Belgian Army capitulated.

His story is a witness of the authentic events that took place from 10 may to 27 may 1940.

It stands in sharp contrast with the false accusations and declarations by the Belgian, British and French leaders at that time and by those who, until now, persevere in spreading the slanderous allegations by Paul Reynaud (French Prime Minister) and Winston Churchill.

This report can not and may not be questioned.

L.Van Leemput

PREFACE

THE FLOOD of poisonous abuse which was directed at King Leopold after the capitulation of the Belgian Army last May, of course, inspired by certain Frenchmen seeking a scapegoat to cover their own failures and shortcomings.

It is difficult to overtake a lie and, although this calumny, which was widely believed at that time, has to a great extent died down in the light of the truth, unfair and ungenerous statements reappear from time to time.

Monsieur Cammaerts is to be congratulated on having produced, in these pages, a wealth of evidence which should establish the truth and vindicate the honour of this King beyond all doubt.

As I was with King Leopold at the Headquarters of his army throughout the brief campaign in Belgium, and at the same time in close touch with the Headquarters of the British Army and Government, I had unrivalled opportunities of observing the course of events. I am glad to have this opportunity of declaring that King Leopold was steadfast in his loyalty to the Allies and did everything in his power to help their Armies.

I first met King Leopold in 1918 when his parents, King Albert and Queen Elisabeth, lived at

La Panne, within range of the enemy, under cover of the guns of the Dover Patrol, which I commanded.

King Leopold was then a schoolboy, and he spent his holidays as a private in the 9^th Infantry, which was often in action in the Belgian front-line trenches.

A few hours after the Germans invaded Belgium on the 10^th May 1940, at the request of the Government, I left by airplane to join King Leopold as special liaison officer.

I remained with him until 10 p.m. on the night of the 27^th May.

The Kings bearing was always calm and courageous under the heavy blows he and his people suffered through the treachery of Germany and the failure of the French to prevent the German armoured columns from forcing the Meuse at Sedan, and threatening the right flank of the allied French-British-Belgian Army in the northward.

King Leopold had placed himself and his Army under the French High Command.

In accordance with the orders he received, and conforming to the movements of the French Northern Army and the British Army, the Belgian Army had to retire day after day until it reached the Scheldt, where it was hoped that a final stand would be made. The Belgian G.H.Q. was established at St.André outside Bruges and I stayed with King Leopold at Lophem nearby, later at Wynendael.

On the 20^th May, the French High Command ordered the British and French Armies to prepare to fight to the south-westward, to regain contact with the main French Army to the Southward.

I was at the British G.H.Q. at Wahagnies when these orders were received and it was generally recognised that the abandonment of the Belgian Army was inevitable, unless it could conform to this movement.

On my return to the Belgian G.H.Q., I told King Leopold of the instructions Lord Gort had received, and said that it was hoped by my Government that the Belgian Army would conform and keep contact with the left flank of the British Army.

The King of the Belgians asked me to inform the British Government and Lord Gort, that the Belgian Army existed solely for defence and possessed neither tanks nor aircraft, nor the equipment for offensive warfare. Owing to the influx of refugees, not more than fourteen day’s food remained in the small part of Belgium left to him. He did not feel that he had any right to expect the British Government to consider jeopardising, perhaps, the very existence of the British Army in order to keep contact with the Belgian Army.

He asked me to make it clear that he did not wish to do anything to interfere with any action which the British Government might consider it desirable for the British Army to undertake towards the southward.

He asked me to say, however, that he fully realised that such action would finally lead to the separation of the two Armies and, in this event, the capitulation of the Belgian Army would be inevitable.

I sent a telegram to this effect to the Prime Minister and Lord Gort, and gave a copy to Lord Gort, personally, the next day.

On the 21^st May, I was with King Leopold at Ypres when we met General Weygand, the new Generalissimo of the Allied Armies. General Weygand confirmed the orders which had been given to the French and British Armies on 20^th May, and requested King Leopold to withdraw from the Scheldt to the Lys, in order to allow the British Army to retire behind the strong defensive position on the frontier – which it had constructed and occupied throughout the winter – preparatory to attacking to the southward with the French Army.

On our return to Bruges, King Leopold told me that he had agreed to take over the line of the Lys as far as the frontier, in order to release British divisions to carry out the offensive contemplated by General Weygand, although this necessitated his placing practically the whole of the Belgian Army along a front of 90 kilometres, opposite which a number of German divisions had been identified. He felt, however, that the projected French-British offensive had been delayed too long and that, at this late hour, the only hope of extricating the French and British Armies, which had been cut off by the German thrust, was to establish a cover to the Belgian ports and Dunkirk, by strengthening contact with the Belgian Army and occupying the Lys –Gravelines line. He pointed out that the well-prepared frontier line, to be held by the British troops on his flank, was very strong and was unlikely to be seriously attacked, but that to be held by the Belgian troops was weak and would be comparatively lightly held and thus invited attack. He feared that if it were seriously assaulted with strong air support, the Germans would break through, sever the connection between the two Armies and overwhelm the Belgian Army.

The King asked me to tell my Government that he felt the difficulty of keeping touch with the British Army, if it operated to the southward, was not fully appreciated. He would like above all things to cooperate with us, but it was a physical impossibility under the existing geographical conditions. His Government had been urging him to leave Belgium, before the Belgian Army found it necessary to capitulate. Of course he had no intention of deserting his Army. If the British Government understood his motives, he did not care what others might think. I sent a telegram in this sense at once.

Late that night we heard that General Billotte – the French General in Command – had been fatally injured in a motor accident. The coordination of the efforts of the three Armies had not been very effective in his hands. In those of his successor it was non-existent.

The difficulty of reorganizing the British divisions for the offensive ordered, along roads crowded with vehicles and refugees, was apparently not taken into account by the French High Command, and before the attack could be mounted, the communications of the British Army with its bases at the Channel Ports had been cut.

I visited our G.H.Q., which had withdrawn to Premesque on the 22^nd, and was told by Lord Gort that our army was already on half rations and short of ammunition – not very favourable conditions for an army to launch an attack, in cooperation with units of the French Army which seemed to be thoroughly disheartened by the reverses it had suffered.

On the night of the 23^rd May, with grave misgivings, King Leopold fell back, as desired, from hits strong position on the Scheldt to a very much weaker one behind the Lys. At the same time he sent the 68^th French Division – one of two French Divisions which were in reserve on the Belgian left flank and under his orders – across the Yser in Belgian buses and lorries to Gravelines. The only Allied troops left in Belgium were the 60^th French Division.

On 24^th May General Weygand told the Commanders of the British Army and French Northern Army that the advance of the French Army from the southwards was going well, and he ordered them to attack vigorously to the southwards in order to close the gap behind the German Panzer divisions which had broken through to the coast.

By this time the Belgian Army was heavily engaged and it was evident to the Belgian G.H.Q. that they were faced with an attack by eight or nine German divisions with the object of driving the Belgian Army to the northward and severing its contact with the British Army, which was now lying behind its winter line on the frontier.

It was clear to us on the spot that the dangers and difficulties of the situation were not realized by the French high Command and, in response to an urgent request, General Dill, British C.I.G.S., came over on the evening of the 24^th. After staying the night with the British Mission he visited Lord Gort’s Headquarters at Premesque on the following morning.

On our return to Bruges he told King Leopold that the attack to the southward by the French and British Armies, as ordered by General Weygand, would be carried out.

King Leopold showed general Dill on the map the week spot on the Belgian right flank, the weakness of their defence line generally, and the impossibility of holding it and also keeping contact, unless strong help could be provided by the British Army. General Dill promised to ask Lord Gort to do what he could to help contact being maintained.

As the British Army was about to attack to the southward, the King felt that he could best help by keeping touch as long as possible with its left flank. He had already withdrawn his mechanized cavalry division from the left flank on the coast to reinforce the right flank, and he now gave orders for the 15^th Division (infantry with no artillery nor machine guns) from the Yser further to reinforce that flank. This exhausted all his reserves.

I learned later that the British 5^th Division was then ordered to move to the northward to occupy the line from Halluin to Zillebeke and the 12^th Lancers to support the Allied flanks. This helped to cover the British left flank, but did not effectively ease the situation of the Belgian Army, which, in the King’s great effort to help the B.E.F., was strung out from Halluin to the sea on a front of 90 kilometres, and was threatened by German attacks at several points.

Fearing a break-through by the Germans to be inevitable, the Belgians had been collecting rolling stock and massing it along the railways between Roulers and Ypres, and to the southward, to form a barrier to delay the advance of enemy armoured troops to the northward.

On the morning of the 26^th, on learning of the heavy attacks towards Ypres, and the imminence of a break in the Belgian line, I went to our G.H.Q. at Premesque to ask Lord Gort if there was anything I could do to help. He asked me to urge King Leopold to withdraw the Belgian Army towards the Yser.

I gave this message to the King, who said they would do their best, but the only way of averting an imminent and complete disaster was for an immediate British counterattack between the Lys and the Scheldt.I telegraphed this to Lord Gort and found that similar appeals had been conveyed by the British Mission from the Belgian G.H.Q. by telegram and dispatch rider since an early hour that morning.

The question of the Belgian Army retiring to the Yser, if it was forced to fall back from the Lys, had been considered at the conference at Ypres on 21^st May. At that time King Leopold thought this might be the only alternative line, but the recent German thrust, the whole brunt of which had fallen on the Belgians, had, he feared, made a withdrawal to the Yser impracticable.

The King told me later in the day, 26^th May, that he had discussed the matter with his General Staff, who considered that a withdrawal to the Yser was a physical impossibility under the pressure the enemy were exerting. A withdrawal over roads thronged with refugees, without adequate fighter cover, would be costly and would only end in disaster; moreover, it would mean the abandonment of all their ammunition, stores and food.

On the other hand, his G.H.Q. declared that a British counter-attack on the vulnerable flank of the enemy must be undertaken if a disaster was to be averted, and that the opportunity might only last a few hours.

They were insistent that the British Army, on its well-prepared defence line between Halluin and Bourghelles, was well placed, on the flank of the enemy, to strike at his communications and bridge-heads on the Scheldt and the Lys, with every prospect of inflicting a considerable defeat on him, and relieving the pressure on the Belgian Army.

An officer from the British Mission was sent to G.H.Q. that evening to explain the Belgian views.

Having no reserves of his own, King Leopold gave orders for the remaining French 60^th Division to be taken in Belgian vehicles to a prepared position across the Yser, which had by now been flooded over a wide area, and its bridges mined.

(Note: This order was carried out the next morning, according to arrangements made with General Champon, Head of the French Mission. If this division was moved from this position, the Belgians cannot be rendered responsible for the change. General Champon had established his Headquarters at La Panne and was in sole Command of the French troops remaining in Belgium.)

The King remarked to me that if the British Army had been preparing to attack to the south-westward, as he had been informed, it would be difficult for it to mount an attack to the eastward, in time to prevent the Belgian right flank being crushed and its line overwhelmed.

But the British Army was in no better condition to deliver the counter-attack for which the G.H.Q. pleaded, than the Belgian Army was to disengage and withdraw to the Yser as demanded by Lord Gort.

Although King Leopold did not know at that time, and no message to this effect ever reached him, Lord Gort had already received orders to withdraw to the coast and was preparing to do so.

Meanwhile the fighting on the Belgian front had been continuous for four days and the Belgian Army, short of food and ammunition, had withstood a tremendous onslaught from eight German divisions, including several armoured units supported by wave after wave of dive bombers. Fighting with great gallantry, the Belgians had delivered several counter-attacks, slain some thousands of Germans and taken several hundred prisoners, but they were nearing the end of their resistance.

On the morning of the 27^th May, King Leopold asked me to tell Lord Gort that he feared a moment was rapidly approaching when he could no longer rely on his troops to fight or be of further use to the British Army. He would be obliged to surrender before a débâcle.

He fully appreciated that the British Army had done everything in its power to help Belgium, and he asked Lord Gort to believe that he had done everything in his power to avert this catastrophe.

I sent this message by wire to Lord Gort, as all telephone communications had been cut, but I understand he did not receive it.

At that time King Leopold hoped to be able to hold out for another day, but by the afternoon the German Army had driven a wedge between the Belgian and British Armies and pierced the line in two or three places.

Every road, village and town in the small part of Belgian hands was thronged with hundreds of thousands of refugees, and they and the troops were being mercilessly bombed by low-flying aircrafts.

Knowing that he could do nothing further to help his Allies, King Leopold told me and the British and French Missions at his G.H.Q. that he intended to ask for an armistice at midnight in order to avoid further slaughter of his sorely-tried people.

The British Mission informed the War Office by wireless, and the message was received in London at 5.54 p.m., but all efforts to get in touch with our G.H.Q. failed.

(Note: General Champon stated that he had been unable to communicate with General Blanchard, who’s Headquarters had been moved, but that he had succeed in making contact with General Weygand by radio)

King Leopold had been asked by his Government, and ours, to leave his country and to carry on the war from without, but he told me that, as Commander-in-Chief of his Army, which was fighting a desperate battle, he must share the fate of his troops. His mother, Queen Elisabeth, was with him throughout these last days and elected to share his captivity.

The King told me that he realized his position would be very difficult, but he would use every endeavour to prevent his countrymen from being compelled to associate themselves with any action against the countries which had attempted to help Belgium in her plight.

As the King and the Queen refused to accompany me to England, and the enemy were close to Bruges, I took my leave of Their Majesties at 10 p.m. on the 27^th, and made my way to Nieuport, where I was picked up by a motor torpedo boat just before dawn on the 28^th May.

As is now well known, King Leopold made no separate peace, and is a prisoner of war.

Misfortune has overwhelmed his country for a second time in his life, but the Belgians may well be proud of their King, for he has proved himself to be a gallant soldier, a loyal ally and a true son of his splendid parents.

ROGER KEYES

Tingewick House,

Buckingham,

May, 1941

Letters to the Times

King Leopold’s stand upheld

Memorandum of Alleged Hitler Talk is Viewed as Untrue

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

In THE TIMES of Nov.3, David Anderson reports from Brussels the publication of a Nazi memorandum on the conversation between Hitler and King Leopold in November, 1940.

This curious document calls for some analysis; it all boils down to an issue of veracity between King Leopold and Adolf Hitler.

The King has always enjoyed an unchallenged reputation for honesty and truthfulness.

I have known him personally since he was 14 years old and have yet to hear his word questioned even by those who disagree with him. I cannot say as much for the late M. Hitler.

Schmidt, the author of the memorandum, I have also known for many years. He was a brilliant interpreter but was more than Hitler’s jackal. He was always ready to distort facts and build up whatever record his master wanted. Otherwise we might well question how long he would have kept his job. Anybody with half an eye can see what Schmidt has done here. It is the familiar Nazi practice of putting into the mouth of another, whatever Hitler wanted him to say.

Goebbels missed opportunity

It is, however, something of a strain on the imagination to ask us to believe that after the way the King had resisted all Nazi overtures for collaboration he would have expressed himself as reported in the memorandum, thus: “He entered this conversation with the Fuehrer in full confidence because he new how to appreciate the great work the Fuehrer has undertaken and knew his wish to give Europe a durable peace based on justice, collaboration and understanding between peoples. With such a program the Belgians would certainly cooperate.”

Knowing Hitler’s methods it is clear that if the King had made any such remarks Dr. Goebbels would have reported them over the air without delay. And, further, Hitler would have lost no time in setting up the puppet government the Nazis had been striving so anxiously to set up in Belgium.

The best proof that there is no word of truth in the Nazi memorandum is that from the day of the capitulation to the end of the war the King remained a prisoner of war, denied the right to speak publicly, and receive visitors and correspondence. Would he have remained in this state if already in 1940 he was ‘seeking to collaborate’?

If we are going to accept Hitler’s memoranda as reliable evidence we ought at least to be logical. In that event we ought to be ready to accept Hitler as a character witness and recognize the excellence of anybody he praises. That might lead us far.

King remained prisoner

On May 28, 1940, the day of the Belgian capitulation, a high ranking German general arrived at the King’s headquarters and announced that he had come to escort the King back to his palace in Brussels.

The King asked what the status of his officers and men was. When told that they were prisoners of war he said that he would refuse to accept any other status – and the proof of the pudding is that he did remain a prisoner throughout the war.

The whole story of the King of the Belgians is shrouded in a fog of misinterpretation.

The opinion of most people is founded on a single statement by Paul Reynaud, the French Prime Minister, in announcing the Belgian capitulation. Reynaud was in desperate straits.

His government as well as his army was tottering toward collapse. More than anything in the world he needed a scapegoat to turn the public indignation away from himself.

The Belgian capitulation gave him just what he needed; the King was already a prisoner and no matter what was said about him he was unable to answer or defend himself.

So Reynaud let himself go in an assault on the character of a defenceless man.

Facts are available

When the true story of the Belgian capitulation comes to be known the King will emerge, not as the cowardly traitor depicted by Reynaud, but rather as one of the great heroic figures of the war.

I know that this is a startling statement to those unfamiliar with the facts; but it is a statement that will be borne out by history. The facts are there. They come from many unimpeachable sources.

For instance, Sir Roger Keyes, who represented the British Government at the King’s headquarters and remained with him up to the last possible moment, has repeatedly defended the King in speeches, letters and articles. He was in constant contact with his government throughout those critical days of May when the Belgian and British armies fell back step by step from the first advanced positions to the sea.

In no single instance were the Belgians forced back by the Germans. In each instance they fell back under specific orders from the Commander in Chief, General Weygand. These orders were imposed by the fact that the French armies on the right flank had given way and retreat was imperative to keep the Germans from getting behind the Belgian and British forces and encircling them.

Finally the Belgian armies were crowded into a small territory with its back to the sea, without air support, without munitions, food and even water running short.

On May 20 Sir Roger Keyes reported to his government that the situation was desperate and that, with the best will in the world, the Belgians could not hold out for more than forty-eight hours.

As a matter of fact, under these tragic conditions they held out just four times as long, suffering frightful losses in order to bar the Nazi road to Dunkerque, where the great evacuation of British and French troops was already under way.

During this period the Belgians new that their own position was hopeless and that sooner or later they were doomed to surrender. Prudence or selfishness would have dictated an immediate surrender when they might have secured better terms.

There is no getting around the fact that they sacrificed themselves in the common cause and contributed in no small measure to the success of the Dunkerque operation, which alone made it possible for Britain to continue the war.

The King could easily have got away to the safety of London and was indeed urged to do so; But he made the hard choice of staying with his troops and sharing their fate, knowing how hard it would be – and how he would be represented.

It is this man whom Hitler depicts crawling into his presence with assurances of collaboration.

As Americans we are not properly concerned with the current Belgian controversy as to whether the King is to return to the throne. That is their affair. But we can recognize the infamy of seeking to discredit an honourable man by appealing to the veracity of that great exponent of truth and honour, the late Adolf Hitler.

HUGH GIBSON

New York, Nov. 7, 1945

The writer of the foregoing letter, a veteran American diplomatist, has held, among other important posts, those of our first Minister to the new Republic of Poland, Minister to Switzerland and Ambassador to Belgium. He collaborated with Herbert Hoover in writing “The Problems of a Lasting Peace”.

FROM OUR READERS

Extract from the “Memoirs” of Sir Admiral Keys o f the British Fleet, May 1941

I quote some important eyewitness passages from the man who was the British Liaison Officer to the Belgian Army during the 18 days of fighting (10 May-28 May).

Admiral Keyes remained with King Leopold until May 27, before he returned to England.

Admiral Keyes diaries and papers, as well as numerous documents, prove beyond any doubt, that Churchill (his boss!), was fully aware of the fact that the Belgian army did not expose the flank of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).

The Belgian army, by its brave and prolonged resistance, until nearly two days after the BEF began its evacuation (without informing the Belgians or the French!), held up the advance of what was originally 8 German divisions and was increased to 14 divisions, supported by the bulk of the German Luftwaffe.

By holding up the Germans during this four day period, and preventing them from cutting off the BEF’s retreat to the coast, made the miracle of Dunkirk possible.

These are not my words. Lord Keyes, Admiral of the British Fleet, makes his written statement, based on his own eyewitness accounts.

Dan Wybo ( London, Ontario, Canada )

“On the night of May 23, with grave misgivings, King Leopold III fell back, as ordered by the General Weygand, from his stronghold positions on the Scheldt to a very much weaker one behind the Lys River.

On May 24, General Weygand told the commanders of the British army and the French Northern army to attack with vigour southwards, in order to close the gap behind the German Panzer divisions, which had broken through.

By this time, the Belgian army was heavily engaged, and it was evident to the Belgian General Headquarters that they were faced with an attack by eight German divisions, with the object of driving the Belgian army to the north and severing its contact with the British army, which was now lying behind its pre May 10^th phoney war winter line on the frontier.

Although King Leopold did not know at that time and no message to this effect ever reached him, Lord Gort had already received orders to withdraw to the coast.

In a message to Gort from Churchill “It is now necessary to tell the Belgians. I am sending to Keys, but your personal contact with the King is desirable. Keys will help. We are asking them to sacrifice themselves for us.”

Although Gort had his orders to tell King Leopold, he did not. Meanwhile the fight on the Belgian front had been continuous for four days.

Every road, village and town in the small part of Belgium left was thronged with hundreds of thousands of refugees, and low flying aircrafts were mercilessly bombing the refugees and the troops.

The Belgian army was created solely for defence; it had neither tanks nor aircraft to mount any kind of offensive.

From the moment it was ordered to retreat to weaker positions, its fate was doomed. With no Royal Air Force (RAF) support, it maintained a 90 kilometre front.

Most British and French account fails to recognize the significance of the battle along the Lys. Here the Belgian army suffered 40.000 casualties. Yet, it may well be asked what would have happened to the British Expeditionary Force and the Northern French armies if the Belgians had not prepared to fight to the last. Before this important battle, the King promised his troops, no matter what happens, I will share your fate.

(“Wat er ook moge gebeuren, mijn lot zal het uwe zijn”)

As long as the Belgian army could fight, it kept on fighting to the last. All reserves were in the fight up until the end.

Knowing he could do nothing further to help his Allies, King Leopold told Keyes, the British and the French that he intended to ask for an armistice.

His Government and the British Government asked King Leopold to leave his country and carry on the war from England.

As commander in chief of his army, he maintained his promise to his troops to share their fate. He made no separate peace and became a prisoner of war.”

Written by Sir Admiral Keyes M.P. Admiral of the British Fleet, May 1941

Now, some 65 years later, our hearts still remember his promise to our troops: “Mijn lot zal het uwe zijn” (“Your fate will be mine”). Many a Belgian can recall that the King stayed; he did not run away, he kept his promise.

His Majesty became the scapegoat for the French Premier, Paul Reynaud and the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.

Dan Wybo

King Leopold III and the Legend

On the 8th of July 2006, a British newspaper published on the front-page: “we Briton will never be defeated”, hereby referring to the words of Sir Winston Churchill, when he promised the final victory during World War II.

But the paper forgot to state another, even more important citation of him:

“meanwhile, there can be much fear, pain and madness”.

Both predictions can still be used to-day, while those words confirm that the past sometimes will bear our future.

I just mentioned Sir Winston Churchill. Please allow me to open a short parenthesis on a subject close to my heart and that of my fellow members of the Royal League of King Leopold III.

We all know that a judgement on circumstances is based on information, considered to be correct as available at that moment.

When politicians have to judge, whoever they may be, even the greatest Englishmen, it sometimes happens that they prefer to bend or twist the facts, hereby violating the truth, only for one purpose: blaming someone else for their shortcomings and consequently: saving their own skin.

We all know that, in 1940, the prime ministers of France and d Great Britain- Paul Reynaud and Churchill- made King Leopold III the scapegoat to cover up their failures. In fact, Lord Keyes made this very clear in his book

“Outrages Fortune”.

Our national president, Colonel Van Leemput, recently reminded those facts by letter, addressed to President Chirac and to Prime Minister Tony Blair.

These are historical facts and we all should be open minded and be able, and willing, to discuss these matters among friends, meanwhile remembering that Sir Winston Churchill was indeed a great statesman.

If you are wondering about a positive and constructive answer from Chirac or Blair…well, as you may guess that’s another story.

Herman Van de Velde 16 september 2006

March 27, 2005

( OPEN LETTER )

To: Mr. Tony Blair

Prime Minister

Downing Street 10

London

United Kingdom

Dear Sir,

This year we will commemorate the end of the Second World War in Europe, 60 years ago, on the 8^th of may 1945.

It will be inevitable, by the same token, to remember the start of this monstrous war, 65 years ago, on 1 September 1939. As a result of the declaration of war on Germany by France and Great Britain, the neutral countries became, eight months later, the first victims.

We will remember a number of key events which happened as from May 10^th 1940:

* on May 10^th: the German invasion of the neutral countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg

* on May 14^th: the German panzers capture the French town Sedan

* on May 15^th: the telephone call from Paul Reynaud (French Prime minister) to Winston Churchill:

“We suffered a defeat. We are defeated. We have lost the battle”

* on May 15^th: the private conversations between Paul Reynaud and general Spears during which he quoted:

“When the moment for negotiations concerning surrender will present itself, I will

transfer the responsibility for these talks onto the shoulders of some one else”

* on May 17^th: the French general Gamelin (Supreme commander of the allied forces) advises Paul Reynaud to consider an armistice request.

* on May 18^th: general Pownall gives the order to withdraw 28.000 men from the British Expeditionary Force i.e. long before the start of “Operation Dynamo” on May 26^th

* on May 20^th: the German panzers encircle the town of Abbeville (near the French coast)

* on May 20^th: Winston Churchill ordered the preparation for the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force

* on May 25^th: the town of Boulogne (at the French coast) falls into the hands of the Germans

Part of the French forces, the entire British Expeditionary Force and the entire Belgian forces are now completely surrounded.

We will also remember:

* on May 20^th: the decision by Paul Reynaud to withdraw general Gamelin and to install General Weygand as Commander in Chief of the allied forces.

* on May 25^th: the conclusive declaration by General Weygand:

“France started a war without any adequate equipment and without any military

preparation; it was a criminal act to declare a war under these circumstances on

3 September 1939”

* on May 26^th:start of “Operation Dynamo”: 225.000 British and 113.000 French officers and soldiers escape to Great Britain.

* During the night 26^th-27^th May: the defence line of the Belgian Forces collapses under the extreme pressure from two German divisions

* on May 27^th: the town of Calais is taken by the German forces

It is of capital importance to remember that the Belgian army, lead by the supreme commander, Leopold III, was forced to deliver combats against two German divisions, without any protection on both flanks. The French and British forces had left their positions already on the 26^th of May without informing Leopold III. They were on the run to the beaches of Dunkirk.

These hopeless combats by the Belgian army lasted for two days: May 26^th and May 27^th

In the meantime, the German Luftwaffe had started murderess attacks on the refugees (1 ½ million) in the combat zone.

Hitler’s aim was very clear: surrender or…..extermination of the population?

Leopold III was left with only one possible choice: to lay down the weapons.

All communications between the General Belgian Headquarter, the General Allied Headquarter as well as the British Expeditionary Force were disrupted.

Under these circumstances, Leopold III informed his allies (on 27^th of May, at 15h15) about his intentions through general Champon (French Military Attaché) and Colonel Davy (British military Mission) who in turn informed the War Office where the message was received on May 27^th at 16h40 by general Percival. The General Allied Headquarter at Vincennes received the message at 18h30.

Hitler’s demand was very clear: surrender without any condition!

On May 28^th, at 4h00, the Belgian army laid down their weapons by order of Leopold III.

A courageous and noble act of a great man!

Leopold III, Commander in Chief of the Belgian Army, remained with his soldiers till the very end.

He did not desert as was advised by his ministers!

The heroic battles of the Belgian army, especially during the last two days, had provided extra time to the British and French military forces to realize their evacuation to Great Britain.

Without these battles, the British and French forces would have been completely annihilated!

Some 338.000 allied troupes were rescued; they became later on the core of the liberation army!

The great tragedy started when (on May 28^th, at 8h30) Paul Reynaud, president of the French Council, held a vicious speech which was broadcasted, and in which he declared:

“…..that the Belgian army had surrendered, without conditions, in open field, by order of its King, without notifying his comrades in arms, French and British, opening the route to Dunkirk for the German divisions…..”

In stating this false declaration, Paul Reynaud had no other intention but to indicate a scapegoat in order to cover his incompetence and the shortcomings of the French military organisation (ref. declaration by General Weygand).

Proof of his incompetence was delivered when, on 16^th June 1940, Paul Reynaud felt compelled to resign and to hand over the power to Maréchal Pétain.

Paul Reynaud succeeded even to impose his campaign of slander onto Winston Churchill (who appeared to be very pleased with the indication of a common scapegoat):

On 29^th May, Sir Roger Campbell, British ambassador in Paris, transmitted a request from Mr. Frossard, French minister of information, to the British Cabinet, urging the British authorities to avoid the disclosure of the truth as stated by Admiral Roger Keyes. According to Mr. Frossard, the French public opinion had been “horrified by the “apparent treason of the Belgian king” (end of quote). Any denial would therefore be “an approval of defeatism”.

On June 4^th: Churchill held a speech in the House of Commons where he announced the successful completion of ‘Operation Dynamo’ (the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force from the continent).

Until that day, he had left the British people unaware of the defeat. He took the opportunity to denounce King Leopold III in even stronger words than Paul Reynaud did before.

It is above any doubt that Churchill’s attitude was dictated by, on the one hand, the political pressure by Paul Reynaud and, on the other hand, the fear to recognize publicly the shortcomings of the British Expeditionary Force: no training, no proper equipment, incompetent leadership of general Gort and general Pownall.

Even worse: these generals deserted on their allies (France and Belgium) without any warning!

The further event is well known: on 21^st of June 1940, France signed an armistice agreement with Germany

The cowardly declaration by Paul Reynaud and Churchill’s insulting words became the base of the “Legend of infidelity and treason of King Leopold III, which, as from 28^th of May 1940, was propagated all over the world.

This “legend” would, later on, cause internal problems in Belgium that lead to the abdication of King Leopold III.

All of the above are historical facts to be found in the official documents and therefore cannot be denied.

But there is more!

Sir Roger Keyes, Lord of Zeebrugge and Dover, had been appointed by Winston Churchill, on 10^th of May, as a special liaison officer to King Leopold III. The Admiral remained with the King until the evening of 27^th May, when he and Colonel Davy were picked up by a torpedo boat. They reached Harwich at 8h30 on 28^th May.

These two officers were expert witnesses of the heroic battles of the Belgian army….but Churchill had already made up his mind: he, just like Paul Reynaud, was going to indicate Leopold III and his army as a scapegoat.

He did not want to hear the real story of the two gentlemen officers; instead he categorically did forbid Admiral Keyes to speak out publicly.

Even though King George spoke out in favour of Leopold III, Churchill persevered in his vendetta against Leopold III and the Belgian people which he seemed to dislike altogether.

Lord Keyes would, many years later, state (in his book: A sea of troubles”) that the references, made by Churchill in his book “The Second World War”, were in fact so unfair and misleading-due to omissions and distortions of the facts-that his son, Randolph Churchill, (according to the former archduke Otto von Habsburg) furiously said to him:

“What you have said and written about this, is nothing else but a heap of lies, as you very well know”.

The archduke who was present, describes in his book “Naissance d’un Continent” this heated discussion, which took place at Chequers, the official country house of the British prime minister.

He remembers how Churchill admitted, in a provocative way: “Of course these were lies, but you must not forget that the history of a period is determined by its best author. I am and will remain this author and therefore, whatever I wrote will have to be accepted as being the truth”.

Winston Churchill had, nevertheless, admitted in 1943 (!): …We went at war, unprepared and almost unarmed…”

Further, in his memoirs, he stated about the British Expeditionary Force: “…it was only a symbolic contribution...”

When Winston Churchill died, he took his shameful lies into his grave……..

The attack on the honour of King Leopold III and his army, continuous, until today, to throw a shadow of distrust and resentment in the heart of the Belgian people, certainly with the thousands of veterans and all Belgians who are still very well aware of what happened in May 1940.

At a moment where all European citizens dream of unity, peace, prosperity and friendship, it has, in my humble opinion, become imperative to eliminate the lies from the past.

A unified Europe can not be built on historical lies!

Mister Prime Minister, the year 2005 might be, in my opinion, the proper and unique occasion, in a spirit of conciliation, for the British Government to show the goodwill and the courage in presenting regrets for the attitude of Winston Churchill in 1940 and thereafter. The friendship between our two nations can only be beneficiary.

Mister Prime Minister, please accept the expression of my profound respect.

Louis Van Leemput

National President

PS: Prime Minister Tony Blair never replied to this letter !