Politically, the New Order continued to be a stable regime partly because of economic development across the archipelago but mainly because it was underpinned from the beginning by military power. It would be incorrect to describe it as a military regime, and Suharto, in the early years of his presidency, was concerned to observe constitutional forms. His initial government had strong civilian components in the persons of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of Yogyakarta and Adam Malik (both of whom later served as vice president). But military strength, allied closely with bureaucracy, was apparent nonetheless, and the government developed clear authoritarian characteristics.

Suharto acted to control and discipline, and ultimately to rationalize, the political parties. In 1973 the four Muslim parties (Parmusi, formed as a successor to Masyumi, together with the NU, PSII, and Perti) were amalgamated to form the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; PPP), and the five non-Muslim parties (PNI, Parkindo, Katholik, IPKI, and Murba) were amalgamated to form the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia; PDI). More formidable than either was the government-sponsored organization, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya; Sekber Golkar, or Golkar). In theory, Golkar was a nonpartisan organization representing, like Sukarno's functional groups, the elements of which the nation was composed; in practice, it was a government party, and its sweeping electoral successes owned much to pressure brought to bear on voters by government agencies. In 1971 it secured 236 seats out of 360 in the DPR, and its dominance was confirmed in subsequent elections in 1977, 1982, and 1987. Important also as a measure of political control was the government's imposition of the Pancasila, or the Five Principles (belief in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice) as the national ideology.

Between 1971 and 1988 parliamentary elections were followed by the unopposed reelection of Suharto for successive presidential terms. These results were not achieved without effort. Suharto's economic policies and, in particular, the attempt to spread development more evenly across the archipelago, contributed to reducing the strong regional feelings of the 1950s, though there remained perceptions that the regime was dominated by Java. A special case was Irian Jaya, where the government has had to contend with the resistance of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka; OPM), even after the 1969 Act of Free Choice, with actual outbreaks in 1977, 1978, and 1981. Encouragement of immigration from Java and elsewhere and extended educational opportunities intended to make Irian Jaya more fully a part of Indonesia were seen as examples of cultural imperialism. The exploitation of the resources of the province--oil, natural gas, copper, and timber--was also a source of resentment.

Unlike Irian Jaya, which had always been claimed by Indonesia as a part of the republic, the Portuguese colony of Timor had not been the subject of any such claim until political changes in Portugal threw the future of the colony into doubt. In 1975-76 Indonesia forcibly incorporated East Timor (subsequently Timor Timur province) into the republic in a fashion that evoked domestic as well as foreign criticism and left the government facing a continuing, and particularly harsh, pacification operation against Fretilin (Frente Revolucionário de Este Timor Independente), the resistance movement struggling for an independent East Timor. By the late 1980s Indonesia appeared to be in control but with enormous tasks of reconstruction to undertake.

In addition to these areas of specific resistance there has been some Islamic opposition to the regime. Developments in Muslim thought tended increasingly to blur the old stereotyped distinction between modernist and traditionalist, or fundamentalist, thinking. Though dealing essentially with theological issues, the effect of these shifts in emphasis was felt as a movement of Islamic renewal both within and outside the PPP. Focused initially on dislike of the essentially secular ideology of Pancasila, they came to represent a more general ambivalence. There were also some intellectual and student criticisms of the corruption built into the structure of the economy, which was seen as reaching into the highest levels of government. There were examples of open discontent, as when students chose the visit of the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei in 1974 to initiate demonstrations against Suharto and against the role of foreign capital in Indonesia; the demonstrations developed into open rioting in Jakarta. In 1978, before the reelection of Suharto for a third term, the government felt it necessary to close sections of the press and to arrest student leaders.

Political lines of division within Indonesian society have not been easy to define, but insofar as they have contained elements of rivalry between centre and regions, opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims, tensions between different strands of Islam, and, in Java, the division between santri and abangan, as well as between rich and poor, they have reflected divisions of long standing.

International relations.

Indonesia's domestic stability has been accompanied by moderation in external policies. The country's standing as a Third World leader was enhanced in 1985 when it hosted a second Asian-African Conference to commemorate the one held in 1955. In conjunction with the government of Papua New Guinea, Indonesia sought to contain incidents on the border between Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea. In 1989 it reached agreement with Australia on the exploitation of seabed resources between the two countries. More generally, Indonesia participated increasingly in the affairs of the region. Through ASEAN it took a firm stand against Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea (Cambodia) and in 1989-90 played a major part in exploring the possibilities of a negotiated resolution of the Indochina problem.