Pointe du Hoc
	Allied intelligence had taken great pains to locate all coastal gun batteries that could menace the invasion, and a total of seventy-three in fixed emplacements had been identified. The most formidable along the American beaches was the six-gun battery at Pointe du Hoc, which was capable of engaging targets at sea and of firing directly onto UTAH and OMAHA Beaches. The guns were thought to be 1 55mm, with a range of 25,000yd and, in preparing their bombardment plans, the Americans placed Pointe du Hoc on top priority. It was decided that the gun positions would be steadily bombed during May, with a heavier than average attack by both day and night three days before D-Day, and then again during the night of 5 June. The potential threat of the Pointe du Hoc battery was seen to be so great that the 2nd Ranger Batalion was given the task of capturing the position directly after H-Hour. The battery position is set upon cliffs that drop vertically some 1 00ft to a very small rocky beach. In addition to the main concrete emplacements, many of which were connected by tunnels or protected walkways, there were trenches and machine-gun posts constructed around the perimeter fences and the cliff's edge. The German garrison numbered about two hundred men of the static 716th Coastal Defence Division, mostly non-Germans. The responsibility for the assault on Pointe du Hoc lay with General Gerow's V Corps and hence with the 1 st Infantry Division and thence with the right-hand assault formation, the 116th Infantry Regiment attached from 29th Division. They were given two Ranger battalions under command to do the job. The position was out on a limb, separated from DOG Green, the nearest edge of the main OMAHA beach at Vierville, by four miles of close country. Between them was another prominent feature, Pointe de la Percée, which like Pointe du Hoc jutted out into the sea. The plan called for three companies of 2nd Ranger Battalion to land below the cliffs, climb them and then make a direct assault the battery. Meanwhile, a fourth company was scheduled to land on DOG Green with the 116th Infantry and to move west to tackle fortifications at Pointe de la Percée in order to cover the flank of the main Ranger force here. On D-Day the Rangers were late. The strong easterly tide had pulled them too far east, and in the morning light and confusion of the air and sea bombardment Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder, commanding the 2nd Battalion, mistook Pointe de la Percée for Pointe du Hoc. Over to the right the prominent feature jutting into the sea is Pointe de la Percée. Realising his mistake, the Colonel turned his small flotilla of seven British-crewed LCA's (three had already sunk in the heavy seas and the men were baling out with their steel helmets in the ones which remained afloat), and moved in this direction, parallel to the shore and some 1 00yd out. They came under the direct fire of those manning the trenches, and the Rangers turned inshore and landed some 500yd away to your right. There, Colonel Rudder established his HQ, featured in a well known photograph showing the spread-out American flag. The Rangers headed for the cliffs. In a novel approach they had fitted DUKWs with fireman's ladders, but the small beach had been so cratered by the earlier fire support by the battleship Texas and others, that the vehicles could not reach the cliff. Rocket-fired grapples were tried, but the ropes, heavy with sea water, held many down, and so with ladders and daggers the Americans began to climb. The responsibility for the defence of the area had been taken over by the 352nd Division, a full attack formation, following its move forward to the coast by Rommel in February 1944, but fortunately the troops here were those of the Coastal Defence Force. In anticipation of commando landings, the Germans had placed 240mm shells attached to trip wires at 100yd intervals along the cliff, and the forward troops were amply supplied with hand grenades which they rolled down as the Americans climbed up. The area was in a state of great confusion. Minutes before the Rangers arrived eighteen medium bombers raided the German positions, driving the defenders underground and, as the attacking troops struggled to gain the top of the cliffs, they had direct and very effective fire support from the US destroyer Satterlee and the British destroyer Talybont. Only very stubborn or foolhardy defenders remained at the cliff s edge to take a personal part in the proceedings and, once on top, the Rangers, scattering small arms fire around them, worked quickly across the torn and smoking ground to the gun emplacements. When they got there they found that the guns had been removed. Colonel Rudder then split his small command into two. One stayed where it was and prepared a defensive position while the other set off up the road, now called Rangers Road, to find the guns, which fortunately they did. They were hidden in an orchard at the back of the field where Rangers Road meets the D514. They were well camouflaged but unguarded and, using thermite grenades, the Rangers destroyed them. To this point, despite the difficulty of assault and because of the air and naval fire support, the Americans' casualties had been relatively light, probably thirty to forty, but later that day the 1 st Battalion of the 91 4th Regiment began a series of counterattacks that nearly wiped out the small bridgehead and caused most casualties. Aware of the isolation of the men at Pointe du Hoc, the 11 6th Infantry Regiment, with the 5th Ranger Battalion which had landed with them at OMAHA four miles to your right, attempted to link up with the 2nd Ranger Battalion but were stopped 1 ,OOOyd short. That night the 91 4th Regiment drove the Americans into a small enclave-along the cliff, barely 200yd wide, but the Rangers held on, helped by fire from destroyers. On the night of 7 June General Kraiss ordered the 352nd Division to withdraw during the following day to a defensive position along the river Aure, just south of the N13, but it was not until just before noon on 8 June that the Rangers were relieved by a tank and infantry force of 11 6th Infantry Regiment, supported by the 5th Ranger Battalion. Before that, however, they had been bombed by Allied planes and fired on by their own side. Such is the fog of war. Their final casualties were 135 killed, wounded and missing out of a total of 225 that landed at Pointe du Hoc. This is a casualty rate of 60 per cent. Perhaps the most difficult question to answer about the struggle at Pointe du Hoc is, Whywas the assault made from the sea when the cliffs alone were so formidable?' It seems in retrospect, and appears reasonable to assume, that the same conclusion could have been drawn at the time, that an airborne assault would have been the best way of carrying out the task and with less likelihood of such a high casualty rate. It may be that the Rangers existed and had to be used, perhaps all available airborne forces were committed elsewhere, or maybe the position was too near the cliff's edge to plan operations like Merville or Pegasus Bridge. In the light of what happened to the drops of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, it was fortunate that the planners had opted for an assault from the sea. The memorial area is 30~/2 acres and the site was preserved by the French Comité de la Pointe du Hoc. In 1960 a dramatic granite 'dagger' memorial was raised on top of a German concrete bunker, with inscriptions in English and French that commemorate the Rangers' action. On 6 June 1979, in a ceremony attended by General Omar Bradley, the American Battle Monuments Commission took over responsibility for maintenance of the area and just prior to, and since, the visit of President Reagan in 1984, a great deal of tidying-up has taken place. There is a widened Rangers Road, a substantial car park, modern toilets, gravel paths and easy access to many of the bunkers and gun positions. The ground is still scarred with huge craters from the bombing or from the 14in guns of the Texas. On 6 June 1944 it must have been the nearest earthly equivalent to Hades. It is interesting to note that most accounts refer to 'Pointe du Hoc' as 'Pointe du Hoe'. The latter is incorrect, and probably has been carried onward from a spelling mistake in early secret planning documents. The puzzle over the name leads on to the puzzle about the guns. Why did Allied intelligence not know that they had been moved? The answer probably rests with the strict security that the Germans maintained in the area. The only access was via the guard post and no Frenchmen were allowed in under any circumstances, so that the French Resistance, who sent back details about most other gun positions before D-Day, were unable to help. The largest question of all in regard to Allied intelligence, however, lies with their total failure to notice Rommel's movement of the 352nd Division onto the beach called OMAHA. That slip might have cost the Allies the war. As it was, it was a close run thing. It is invidious to single out particular actions for special mention since every soldier who took part in the events of 6 June 1944 did the best he could measured by his own standards. Some did a great deal more. However, there are perhaps three events of the day that attract the greatest comment the Rangers assault on Point du Hoc, the 6th Airborne Coup de Main on Pegasus Bridge and the landings on OMAHA Beach.