6.2 The Suvla Landing

6.2 The Suvla Landing

On 6th August, at 22.00 h the 11th Division, consisting of 32nd, 33rd and 34th Brigades, landed on A Beach in Suvla Bay and on B and C Beaches, just south of it.

At the south flank of the landing area, the units who had set foot on land there carried out their task admirably : they conquered Lala Baba and then moved on north in the direction of Hill 10.

The 34th Brigade, which was to land on A Beach, was not so fortunate. The vessels used for their landing grounded too soon, with the result that troops who jumped out of the boats found themselves up to their necks in the water. To make matters worse, most smaller units got soon mixed up and started suffering casualties when they came under fire from Hill 10 at the other side of the salt lake, where a small number of Turkish defenders had dug in.

As a consequence, the 10th Division, which was next to land, had to be split up : the majority went on land on the southern beaches, but the rest even had to opt for a new landing place further north. Gains in the early hours were restricted to the lower slopes of the Kiretch Tepe, where some progress was made.

Only the following morning did the British succeed in chasing the well-organized Turkish defenders from Hill 10. The confusion caused during the landing, a number of casualties and unexpected heath and thirst made it impossible to stage a new attack on the same day. Only during the night of 7th-8th August were Chocolate Hill and Green Hill captured. Reorganisation of the five battalions that took part lasted till the following morning.

One night and a day of fighting had not been very successful : not a single important height at the outskirts of Suvla plain was in possession of the landing force. To make matters worse : they had not met with any substantial Turkish opposition. It was their own confusion, a complete lack of determination and direction from the higher command and the fact that the Navy proved unable to organize a sufficient supply of water and weapons, which proved responsible for the poor results.

However, the British forces had the luck that Turkish reinforcements, stationed at Bulair and on the Asiatic coast, were unable to reach the area within a span of 24 hours. As a matter of fact, they still had time on 8th August to get a grip on the situation and to try to carry out their orders. The main problem was that Stopford nor his divisional commanders seemed to realize this simple fact.

Although Tekke Tepe Ridge was not defended in real strength, Stopford, who was still on board the Jonquil, refused to take an initiative in that direction before he could get hold of sufficient artillery and ammunition. When some of Hamilton's staff-officers, who were puzzled by the lack of activity, visited the beachhead in the afternoon, they could not believe their eyes, when they found officers drinking tea, while the men were idling on the beach or having a swim in the sea. In the meantime, the clock was slowly ticking away the hours and their luck was inevitably running out.

Only at 17.30 h the order was given to resume the advance, but the divisional commanders preferred to wait till the following morning. Although Hamilton now decided to intervene personally, the preparations for the enterprise took the better part of the night and that was just a little too long : the Turkish divisions from Bulair had arrived at Tekke Tepe. When the British started their advance they were immediately beaten back.

On 10th August, the 53rd Brigade tried again without success and on 12th August, the 54th Brigade was even unable to leave there jumping-off positions. When four days later, part of the Kiretch Tepe positions had to be given up, this meant the end of the Suvla adventure. The dream of a break-through from there was over.